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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the Amended Memorandum Decision and Final 
Judgment of Dismissal and the Final Judgment of the district court dismissing a 
stockholder derivative complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Sections 
78A-3-102(3)G) and 78A-4-103(2)G) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue: Did the district court err in granting the motion to dismiss of 
defendants-appellees Directors and Officers (as defined herein) for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where the 
complaint alleged that the Directors and Officers of a Utah corporation engaged 
in self-interested misconduct, breached their fiduciary duties and committed 
other violations of law by manipulating the price of equity awards for their own 
personal benefit at the expense of the corporation and its stockholders? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a district court's dismissal under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a question of 
law, and therefore is entitled to "no deference" and is "review[ed] under a 
correctness standard." Helf v. Chevron U.SA., Inc., 2009 UT 11, ii 14, 203 P.3d 
962 (citations and internal quotations omitted); Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mtn. 
Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, ii 10, 232 P.3d 999. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in plaintiff-appellant James 
Robert Rawcliffe's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
(R. 435-69), his Notice of Supplemental Authority (R. 509-62), and at the 
January 23, 2015 hearing on the Directors and Officers' motion to dismiss (R. 
755-824). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a stockholder derivative action brought by plaintiff-appellant James 
Robert Rawcliffe ("Rawcliffe") on behalf of nominal defendant-appellee USANA 
Health Sciences, Inc. ("USANA" or the "Company"). Rawcliffe alleges that the 
members of the Compensation Committee (the "Compensation Committee") of 
USANA's Board of Directors (the "Board") breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty 
owed to USANA and wasted corporate assets by deliberately granting themselves 
and other directors and officers of the Company equity awards that were "spring-
loaded," i.e., granted just prior to the release of material information that was 
reasonably expected to drive the market price of the Company's stock higher, 
thereby artificially increasing the value of the equity awards by establishing an 
artificially low exercise price. Rawcliffe also alleges that the Directors' and 
Officers' receipt of such spring-loaded equity awards constituted a further breach 
of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment of the recipients. 
-2-
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Rawcliffe filed his Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint (the 
"Complaint") on August 4, 2014. (R. 1-70). Defendants-appellees Robert 
Anciaux a/k/a Robert Auciaux ("Anciaux"), Jerry G. McClain ("McClain"), 
Ronald S. Poelman ("Poelman"), James H. Bramble, Jim Brown, Gilbert Fuller 
("Fuller"), Kevin G. Guest, Daniel A. Macuga, David A. Wentz ("D. Wentz"), and 
Deborah Woo (collectively, the "Directors and Officers") moved to dismiss the 
Complaint on October 2, 2014. (R. 230-427). Rawcliffe filed his opposition brief 
on November 13, 2014, (R. 435-69), and the Directors and Officers filed their 
reply brief on December 11, 2014, (R. 470-86). On January 9, 2015, Rawcliffe 
filed a notice of supplemental authority attaching a case involving similar facts 
that had recently been decided in the Delaware Court of Chancery in which the 
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 509-62). On January 23, 
2015, the district court held a hearing on the Directors and Officers' motion to 
dismiss. (R. 755-824). 
III. DISPOSITION AT DISTRICT COURT 
On March 18, 2015, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (the "Original Memorandum"). 
(R. 567-79). On April 3, 2015, the district court entered an Amended 
Memorandum and Decision and Final Judgment of Dismissal (the "Amended 
Memorandum"), which superseded the Original Memorandum. (R. 604-20). 1 
1 A copy of the Amended Memorandum is attached at Addendum A. 
On September 22, 2015, the district court2 entered an appealable Final 
Judgment.3 Rawcliffe timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 6, 2015. (R. 
721-25). 
The district court concluded that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the 
grounds that the spring-loading of equity awards does not constitute breach of 
fiduciary duty, waste, or unjust enrichment under Utah law. In so doing, the 
court held, inter alia, that the conduct complained of did not violate the 
Company's equity incentive award plan and was protected by the business 
judgment rule. 
2 The Amended Memorandum was entered by the Honorable Keith A. Kelly. The 
case was subsequently reassigned and the Final Judgment was entered by the 
Honorable Heather Brereton. (R. 716-720). 
3 Rawcliffe filed his original Notice of Appeal on April 10, 2015 (Case No. 
20150365). (R. 621-26). On July 1, 2015, the Supreme Court entered an Order 
electing to retain the appeal on its docket. A copy of the Order is attached at 
Addendum B. On July 22, 2015, the Supreme Court issued an order notifying the 
parties that it was considering sua sponte dismissal of the appeal on the grounds 
that it lacked appellate jurisdiction under CUWCD v. King, 2013 UT 13, 297 P.3d 
619, because the Amended Memorandum entered by the district court did not 
state that no further order was necessary and therefore was not a final, 
appealable order under Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R. 
704). On August 5, 2015, Rawcliffe requested that the Supreme Court dismiss the 
appeal without prejudice so that he could obtain a final, appealable order from 
the district court. A copy of Appellant's Memorandum Addressing Supreme 
Court's Jurisdiction is attached at Addendum C. The Supreme Court granted 
Rawcliffe's request on September 2, 2015. (R. 702-04). On September 22, 2015, 
Rawcliffe, on behalf of all parties to the action, submitted a Joint Request for 
Entry of Final Judgment and a proposed Final Judgment to the district court, 
which was entered the same day. (R. 705-20 ). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. BACKGROUND 
USANA is a Utah corporation that, according to its public filings, develops 
and manufactures "high-quality, science-based nutritional and personal care 
products." (R. 4). In 2006, USANA's Board adopted, and its stockholders 
approved, the USANA Health Sciences, Inc. 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan 
(the "Plan"). (R. 10, 31-56). The stated purpose of the Plan was, among other 
things, to align the interests of the directors and officers of the Company with its 
stockholders "by reinforcing the relationship between participants' rewards and 
shareholder gains." (R. 10, 31). The Compensation Committee, consisting of 
Anciaux, McClain and Poelman, administers the Plan. (R. 10-11). Under the 
terms of the Plan, the Compensation Committee is authorized to grant directors, 
officers, or employees of the Company various types of equity awards, including 
stock-settled stock appreciation rights ("SSARs"), which are rights to receive a 
bonus equal to the difference between the exercise price of the right and the 
trading price of USANA's stock on the date the right is exercised. (R. 11, 31-56). 
The Plan requires that the exercise price of SSARs "shall not be less than 100% of 
Fair Market Value on the date of grant," which the Plan defines as the then-
current trading price of USANA common stock. (R. 11, 40). 
II. THE GRANTING OF THE SPRING-LOADED SSARS 
After the market closed on February 4, 2014, USANA issued a press release 
reporting net sales for the fourth quarter of $186.3 million, an increase of 10.5% 
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over the same period in 2012, and net sales for the year of $718.2 million, a 10. 7% 
increase over 2012. (R. 12). USANA's net sales and earnings per share figures for 
fiscal year 2013 significantly exceeded analysts' estimates, as did the Company's 
guidance for fiscal year 2014. (Id.). Indeed, USANA's Chief Executive Officer, 
defendant-appellee D. Wentz, touted fiscal year 2013 as "an exceptional year." 
(R. 13). 
On February 6, 2014, each of the Directors and Officers identified in the 
chart below filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") a Form 4 
disclosing that on February 3, 2014-just one day before the Company's 2013 
results and 2014 guidance were publicly announced-the Compensation 
Committee members had granted each of the Directors and Officers, including 
the Compensation Committee members themselves, SSARs with an 
exercise price of $s7.62 per share, which was the closing price of USANA's stock 
on February 3rd: 
Name Title Numbeirof SSARs Awarded 
Director and 
Robert Anciaux Compensation 12,000 
Committee member 
James H. Bramble Chief Legal Officer and 37,000 Secret~ 
Jim Brown Chief Production Officer 32,500 
Gilbert Fuller Director 12,000 
Kevin G. Guest President of North 58,500 America 
Daniel A. Macuga Chief Communications 34,500 Officer 
Jerry G. McClain Director and Com_Q_ensation 12,000 
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Committee member 
Director and 
Ronald S. Poelman Compensation 12,000 
Committee Chair 
David A. Wentz Chief Executive Officer 40,983 
Deborah Woo President of Asia Pacific 58,000 
Total 30_21_483 
(R. 13-14). 
At the time Compensation Committee granted over 300,000 SSARs-
presently worth approximately $19.5 million4-to themselves and other insiders, 
the Compensation Committee was aware of the Company's successful financial 
results, knew the Company would release the results the next day, and expected 
that the Company's stock price would increase substantially upon the release of 
the results. (R. 14). Indeed, upon the release of these results, the trading price of 
shares of USANA's common stock jumped to $68-46 per share on February 5th, 
an 18.8% increase over the trading price when the SSARs were granted on 
February 3rd. (Id.). Thus, the Compensation Committee members deliberately 
granted the SSARs to themselves and the other Directors and Officers 
immediately before the earnings release in order use this inside information to 
take advantage of the market price of USANA's stock on February 3rd before the 
earnings news caused the market price to rise. (Id.). The Compensation 
Committee members' deliberate granting of the SSARs prior to the earnings 
release ensured that the SSARs carried an artificially low exercise price, which 
4 Based on USANA's trading price of $120.62 on March 21, 2016. Yahoo! Finance 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=USNA&a=o2&b=21&c=2016&d=o2&e=21&f= 
2016&g=d. 
made the SSARs more valuable to the Directors and Officers by reducing the 
price USANA stock would have to exceed for the SSARs to be "in the money." 
This practice, the granting of equity awards just prior to the release of 
material information that is reasonably expected to drive the market price of a 
company's stock higher, thereby artificially increasing the value of the equity 
awards by establishing an artificially low exercise price, is known as "spring-
loading." It is well-established under Delaware law that spring-loading is 
improper and constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by the grantors and 
recipients of such equity awards. The Delaware Court of Chancery has succinctly 
described the misconduct of spring-loading: "[ w ]hen you engage in behavior that, 
based on the allegation of the complaint, appears self-interested such that you 
give yourself assets for less than their fair value, that's classic breach of the duty 
of loyalty stuff." In re CytRx Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9864-
VCL, Oral Argument, Defendants' Motions to Stay or Dismiss and the Court's 
Rulings (TRANSCRIPT) at 41:13-18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2015).s To be sure, spring-
loading is "eyebrow-raising self-interested conduct." Id. at 38:13. 
III. THE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS' HISTORY OF SIMILAR 
MISCONDUCT 
The members of the Compensation Committee, as well as USANA's 
Chairman of the Board and controlling stockholder Myron Wentz ("M. Wentz"), 
have a history of engaging in improper activities relating to USANA equity 
s A copy of the CytRx transcript, which contains the court's oral opinion, is 
attached at Addendum D. 
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awards to benefit themselves and other USANA directors and officers. (R. 15). 
Indeed, a review of past equity awards granted by the Compensation Committee 
demonstrates that the Compensation Committee has been manipulating the 
granting of equity awards since 2006-as long as the Plan has been in existence. 
(Id.). 
USANA typically announces its quarterly and year-end earmngs on a 
Tuesday after the close of the stock market. (R. 15). In 2008, 2010, and 2014, 
the Compensation Committee awarded SSARs to various directors and officers 
immediately before the release of quarterly earnings, and each time, the trading 
price of the Company's stock increased following the earnings release: 
Stock 
Date of Exercise Total Date of Price Percent 
SSARGrant Price SSARs Earnings After Increase Granted Release Earnings 
Release6 
Ju!Y_ 21, 2008 $26.06 1,370,000 Ju!Y_ 22, 2008 $28.14 8.0% 
April 27, $35-47 412,500 April 27, 2010 $38.17 7.6% 2010 
February 3, $57.62 309,483 February 4, $68-46 18.8% 2014 2014 
(R. 15-16). 
In contrast, in 2006, 2007, and 2011, the Compensation Committee chose 
to wait to award SSARs or stock options until immediately after the release of 
quarterly earnings, and each time, the trading price of the Company's stock 
decreased following the earnings release: 
6 Closing price the day after earnings were announced, i.e., July 23, 2008, April 
28, 2010, and February 5, 2014, respectively. (R. 16). 
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Total Stock Date (Type) Exercise Equity Date of Price Percent 
of Equity Price Awards Earnings Priorb> Decrease Grant Granted Release Earnings Release? 
April 26, 2,956 
2006 (stock $37.60 options April 18, $41.79 10.0% options and 164,956 2006 
SSARs) SSARs 
April 19, 4,587 April 17, 2007 (stock $40.59 $42.82 5.2% 
o_Qtions) options 2007 
July 27, 2011 $28.16 78,000 July 26, $31.76 11.3% (SSARs) SSARs 2011 
(R. 16). 
The timing of these equity awards is hardly a coincidence. (R. 16). Rather, 
each time the Compensation Committee granted equity awards, its members 
manipulated the timing to ensure that the equity awards had the lowest possible 
exercise price, and thus the highest possible value to the recipients. (Id.). In 
2008 and 2010, as in 2014, the Compensation Committee granted SSARs that 
were spring-loaded, while in 2006, 2007, and 2011, the Compensation 
Committee purposely delayed the grant of equity awards until after negative news 
was released, which caused the stock price, and thus the exercise price of the 
equity awards, to go down, a practice referred to as "bullet-dodging." (R. 16-17).8 
7 Closing price the day earnings were announced, i.e., April 18, 2006, April 17, 
2007, and July 26, 2011, respectively. (Id.). 
8 Bullet-dodging is the corollary to spring-loading and likewise constitutes a 
breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., 
919 A.2d 563, 576 n.16, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007). Bullet-dodging provides the 
recipients of the equity awards with a lower exercise price than they would have 
received if the grant of the equity awards had not been delayed. As a result, the 
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In addition, between December 10, 2012 and December 12, 2012, McClain, 
Poelman and M. Wentz collectively sold over $20.3 million worth of Company 
stock. (R. 17). Shortly after their selling spree, USANA announced a 
"reorganization of its management team," including the resignation of several 
executive officers, which sent the Company's shares tumbling. (R. 17-18). The 
timing and amount of these stock sales strongly indicate that McClain, Poelman, 
and M. Wentz sold their USANA stock on the basis of and because of their 
knowledge of material nonpublic information concerning the impending 
departures of the Company's executive officers. (R. 18). Notably, for Poelman 
and McClain, the amounts sold constituted their entire holdings in USANA 
common stock at the time. (Id.). 
Hence, the February 2014 spring-loading of which Rawcliffe complains in 
this action is not an isolated incident. Rather, it is part of a consistent pattern of 
misconduct in connection with equity awards granted by the Compensation 
Committee and of corporate insiders taking advantage of inside information for 
their own personal benefit. 9 
recipients of bullet-dodged equity awards are able to reap a gain when the stock 
price recovers from the negative news that precipitated the drop. 
9 Utah law requires that a stockholder seeking to enforce derivative claims on 
behalf of a corporation must have been a stockholder of the corporation at the 
time of the wrongdoing complained of. See Utah Code§ 16-1oa-740(2)(a). Here, 
Rawcliffe has been a stockholder of USANA since October 23, 2013, and therefore 
could not bring claims on behalf of the Company for the spring-loading, bullet-
dodging and insider sales that took place prior to such date. 
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IV. RA WCLIFFE MADE A PROPER PRE-SUIT DEMAND, WHICH 
WAS WRONGFULLY REFUSED 
Utah Code§ 16-1oa-740(3) requires that before filing a derivative action to 
challenge misconduct by officers and directors of a Utah corporation, a 
stockholder must first make a written demand on the board of directors to take 
action to address the wrongdoing. The purpose of this statutory scheme is to 
allow the board of directors the first opportunity to take appropriate action, 
including conducting a good faith investigation of the alleged wrongdoing. Thus, 
in accordance with Utah law, on March 18, 2014, Rawcliffe made a demand (the 
"Demand") on the Board to commence an action against the Directors and 
Officers in connection with the spring-loaded SSARs granted in February 2014. 
(R. 19, 58-60). Specifically, Rawcliffe demanded that the Board take action to 
recover damages that USANA has sustained, rescind the grants of the SSARs to 
the Directors and Officers, and correct the deficiencies in the Company's internal 
controls that allowed the misconduct to occur. (Id.). 
On May 28, 2014, USANA's counsel sent a letter rejecting the Demand (the 
"Rejection Letter"). (R. 19-20, 62-66). Such a response was not surprising, as 
the Board-comprised almost entirely of the same individuals who granted 
and/ or received the improperly granted SSARs10-did not appoint independent 
individuals to investigate Rawcliffe's claims as contemplated by Utah's statutory 
10 Specifically, the Board consists of defendant-appellees Anciaux, Fuller, 
McClain and Poelman, all of whom received the spring-loaded SSARs, and Board 
Chairman M. Wentz, whose son, D. Wentz, also received the spring-loaded 
SSARs. (R. 4-7, 14). 
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scheme, nor did it prepare a written report in connection with the purported 
investigation. (R. 20, 70). Rather, the so-called investigation simply rubber-
stamped the Directors' and Officers' misconduct, "conclud[ing] that the February 
2014 SSARs grants were in conformity with governing law and consistent with 
USANA's 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan [and] the [Compensation] 
Committee's action was proper and undertaken in good faith." (R. 19-20, 62). 
The Rejection Letter provided absolutely no facts regarding what the 
purported investigation entailed, e.g., the extent to which documents were 
reviewed or witnesses were interviewed, if at all. (R. 20, 62-66). Instead, the 
Rejection Letter attempted to provide a legitimate explanation for how the 
Compensation Committee members, year after year, granted themselves and 
their fellow Directors and Officers equity awards at consistently low prices. (Id.). 
However, this explanation was simply not credible, as it was based upon 
numerous factual misrepresentations and clearly demonstrated that the Board 
failed to perform a good-faith, reasonable investigation as required by Utah law. 
(R. 21-24). 
For example, the Rejection Letter contended that the timing of all grants of 
equity awards was dictated solely by the schedule of Compensation Committee 
meetings, which were typically held on Mondays, one day before corresponding 
Board meetings held on Tuesdays. (R. 21, 64). A review of the Company's SEC 
filings clearly demonstrates this statement is false. Indeed, while USANA 
typically announces its earnings on Tuesdays after the close of the stock market, 
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the Compensation Committee has only granted equity awards on Mondays twice, 
and on both occasions the trading price of USANA's stock increased following the 
Tuesday earnings release. (R. 22). In contrast, when disappointing results were 
released, the Compensation Committee delayed the grant of awards until after 
such results were made public, i.e., until Wednesday or Thursday, after the news 
had caused the stock price to decrease. (Id.). Thus, the timing of the 
Compensation Committee's grants of Plan-based awards to themselves and their 
fellow directors has never been "solely attributable to[ ] USANA's standard 
scheduling for board and board committee meetings" as the Rejection Letter 
contends. (R. 21-22). Rather, the Compensation Committee has varied the 
timing of equity awards, including the days of the week on which they are 
granted, yet has consistently granted awards with exercise prices most favorable 
to the recipients, including themselves. (R. 22). 
In addition, the Rejection Letter asserts that the Compensation Committee 
could not have predicted that the Company's stock price would rise following the 
February 4, 2014 earnings release because "USANA's share price has historically 
defied that kind of prediction." (R. 23, 64). The Rejection Letter provides a 
single example, when the Company's stock dropped from $40.21 on February 8, 
2011 to $35.00 on February 9, 2011 despite the purported announcement of 
"positive news" on February 8, 2011. (R. 23, 64-65). In actuality, the news 
announced on February 8, 2011 was anything but positive, as USANA announced 
earnings per share and guidance for the year that were substantially lower than 
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analysts' estimates and stated that the Company's outlook was "cautious" because 
investments required to integrate a newly acquired business would be higher 
than originally estimated. (R. 23-24). In sum, the Rejection Letter and the so-
called investigation into the Directors' and Officers' own wrongdoing is just 
another example of the Board members' complete abdication of their fiduciary 
duties as directors of a Utah corporation. 
V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE ACTION 
Rawcliffe filed his Complaint on August 4, 2014. (R. 1-70). The Complaint 
asserts four counts against the Directors and Officers: Counts I and II assert 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and waste of corporate assets, respectively, 
against the Compensation Committee members for granting the spring-loaded 
SSARs. (R. 24-25). Counts III and IV assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
and unjust enrichment against the Directors and Officers in connection with their 
receipt of the spring-loaded SSARs. (R. 25-26). 
The Directors and Officers moved to dismiss the Complaint on October 2, 
2014. (R. 230-427). Rawcliffe filed his opposition brief on November 13, 2014, 
(R. 435-69), and the Directors and Officers filed their reply brief on December 11, 
2014, (R. 470-86). On January 9, 2015, Rawcliffe filed a notice of supplemental 
authority attaching the transcript opinion in CytRx, in which the Delaware Court 
of Chancery denied the defendants' motion to dismiss substantially similar 
claims. (R. 509-62). On January 23, 2015, the district court held a hearing on 
the Directors' and Officers' motion to dismiss. (R. 755-824). 
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On March 18, 2015, the district court entered the Original Memorandum 
granting the Directors' and Officers' motion to dismiss. (R. 567-79). On April 3, 
2015, the district court entered the Amended Memorandum, which superseded 
the Original Memorandum. (R. 604-20) . The district court concluded that the 
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on the 
grounds that the spring-loading of equity awards does not constitute breach of 
fiduciary duty, waste, or unjust enrichment under Utah law. Specifically, the 
district court held that the Compensation Committee members complied with the 
strict letter of the Plan, (R. 611-613, 615), and therefore it did not matter that the 
Compensation Committee members had material inside information that they 
knew would cause USANA's stock price to increase. The district court also held 
that because they complied with the strict letter of the Plan, the Compensation 
Committee's conduct was protected by the business judgment rule. (R. 612-14). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in holding that the spring-loading of equity awards 
does not constitute breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, or corporate 
waste. The duty of loyalty is well-established in the State of Utah. See, e.g., 
Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) ("Directors and officers have 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders."). And Utah 
courts have long held that directors who engage in self-dealing are liable to the 
corporation and its stockholders for breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty. Id. 
at 732 (holding that directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by usurping 
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corporate opportunity); Fausett v. Am. Res. Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 
1241 (D. Utah 1982) (recognizing that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty exists 
when a corporate officer engages in insider trading). The question of whether the 
spring-loading of equity awards is one of the various types of conduct that 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty is an issue of first impression in Utah. But 
this issue has been litigated in other jurisdictions, including Delaware and at least 
one federal district court, which have consistently held that spring-loading equity 
awards constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. See, e.g., CytRx, Tr. 
at 39:13-40:2 (denying motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary duty by 
approving spring-loaded stock option grants); Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 
448 (Del. Ch. 2008) (same); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., 919 
A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); Ausikaitis v. Kiani, 962 F. Supp. 2d 661, 
679 (D. Del. 2013) (same). 
In granting the Directors and Officers' motion to dismiss, the district court 
first misinterpreted these cases, (R. 613-15), as discussed below, and then chose 
not to follow them in any event, (R. 615). Rawcliffe respectfully submits that this 
was error. The courts of Utah often look to the courts of Delaware for guidance 
on matters of corporate law, particularly where there is "no Utah authority 
squarely on point." See, e.g., Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 2015 UT App 52, ~~8, 11-13, 
345 P.3d 1273 (relying on Delaware law in reversing district court's denial of an 
injunction to prevent the sale of stock). Here, there is no Utah law squarely on 
point, and the facts alleged in this action are identical to those in CytRx, Weiss 
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and Tyson, in which the courts held that the plaintiffs adequately stated claims 
for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty against the directors who awarded the spring-
loaded equity awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 39:13-40:2; Weiss, 948 A2d. at 448; 
Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; (2) breach of fiduciary duty against the directors and 
officers who knowingly received the spring-loaded awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 
41:11-18; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 449; (3) unjust enrichment against the recipients of 
the awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 41:19-42:10; Weiss, 948 A2d. at 449-50; Tyson, 919 
A.2d at 602-03; and (4) waste of corporate assets against the directors who 
granted the awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 40:3-41:10; Weiss, 948 A2d. at 450. 
Accordingly, Rawcliffe's Complaint clearly states claims against the Directors and 
Officers in connection with the spring-loaded SSARs. 
The district court erroneously distinguished the instant case from Tyson 
and Weiss on the grounds that here, the Plan required the Compensation 
Committee to use the trading price of USANA's stock on the date the SSARs were 
granted as the exercise price. (R. 615). In fact, this is precisely what the plans in 
Tyson and Weiss required, but the courts in those cases held that the equity 
award grants, which were made with the benefit of material non-public 
information that the defendants knew would cause the stock price to increase, 
"undermine[d] the very objectives" of the plans' requirements that the exercise 
price be equal to fair market value. See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592-93. Furthermore, 
this conduct is not protected by the business judgment rule because the Directors 
and Officers "possessed material non-public information that would affect the 
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company's share price" and issued the SSARs "with an intent to circumvent 
otherwise valid stockholder-approved restrictions" on the exercise price of the 
SSARs, i.e., the fair market value requirement. Weiss, 948 A.2d at 442 n.21 
(citing Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593 & n.75). In sum, the instant case is factually and 
legally indistinguishable from Tyson and Weiss . Accordingly, the district court's 
dismissal of the Complaint should be reversed. To hold otherwise would be to 
encourage fiduciaries of Utah corporations to manipulate the timing of equity 
awards to line their own pockets at the expense of the corporations and 
stockholders they serve. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST THE 
COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR BREACH OF 
THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR GRANTING THE 
SPRING-LOADED SSARS 
A. Utah Law Prohibits Self-Dealing By Corporate Fiduciaries, 
and the Spring-Loading of Equity Awards Is a Type of Self-
Dealing 
The district court erred in holding that spring-loading does not constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty in Utah. The duty of loyalty is well-established in the 
State of Utah. See, e.g., Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730 ("Directors and officers have 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders."); Elggren v. 
Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 192, 228 P. 906 (Utah 1924) ("Directors of a corporation 
occupy a position of trust and confidence and are considered in the law as 
standing in a fiduciary relation toward the stockholders"). Utah courts have long 
held that directors who engage in self-dealing are liable to the corporation and its 
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stockholders for breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Nicholson, 
642 P.2d at 732 (holding that directors breached fiduciary duty of loyalty by 
usurping corporate opportunity); Elggren, 64 Utah at 192 ("The directors of a 
corporation are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to 
further their private interests .... "(citations and quotations omitted)). 
Indeed, as early as 1924, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "courts 
have adopted and are strictly and rigidly enforcing a policy which minimizes the 
temptation of officers of corporations to prefer their own interests rather than 
those of the corporation and the stockholders." Id. at 194. The Utah Supreme 
Court has further recognized that: 
As agents intrusted with the management of the 
corporation for the benefit of the stockholders and 
creditors, [directors] occupy a fiduciary relation, and are 
held liable to the corporation as trustees. . . . "Directors 
and other officers must exercise the utmost good faith in 
all transactions touching their duties to the corporation 
and its property. . . . All their acts must be for the 
benefit of the corporation and not for their own benefit. 
. . . They are not permitted to profit as individuals by 
virtue of their position." 
Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 384-85, 296 P. 
231(Utah1931) (quoting 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272); see also Nicholson, 642 
P.2d at 730 ("Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their 
corporation and its stockholders. . . . They are obligated to use their ingenuity, 
influence, and energy, and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to 
preserve and enhance the property and earning power of the corporation, even if 
the interests of the corporation are m conflict with their own personal 
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interests."); Bingham Consol. Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, ii 22, 105 P.3d 
365 (same) . 
There are many different ways in which a director or officer can breach his 
or her fiduciary duties owed to a corporation. See, e.g., C&Y Corp. v. Gen. 
Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (providing several 
examples of conduct that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, including: 
usurpation of corporate opportunity; using "confidential information to the 
corporation's detriment"; and "urg[ing] the corporation to sell an asset to the 
detriment of the corporation and its stockholders"); Fausett, 542 F. Supp. at 1241 
(recognizing that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty exists when a corporate 
officer engages in insider trading). 
The instant action is the first Utah case in which corporate directors are 
alleged to have breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by spring-loading equity 
awards. In such circumstances, Utah courts often look to the courts of Delaware 
for guidance on matters of corporate law, particularly where, as here, there is "no 
Utah authority squarely on point." See, e.g., Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 2015 UT App 
52, i!ii8, 11-13, 345 P.3d 1273 (relying on Delaware law in reversing district court's 
denial of an injunction to prevent the sale of stock); Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63, 
iJiJ24-26, 289 P.3d 479 (relying on and adopting Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 
(Del. 2006) regarding the distinction between derivative and direct claims); 
Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130, 132-35 (Utah 1997) (relying on 
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. , 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) in determining fair value of 
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stock in appraisal proceeding brought pursuant to Utah statute); Nicholson, 642 
P.2d at 730 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939) in discussing the 
fiduciary duty ofloyalty owed by corporate directors). 
Delaware courts have consistently held that spring-loading allegations 
identical to those here are sufficient to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., CytRx, Tr. at 39:13-40:2; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 448; 
Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593. As explained by Delaware's then-Chancellor Chandler: 
The relevant issue is whether a director acts in bad faith 
by authorizing options with a market-value strike price, 
as he is required to do by a shareholder-approved 
incentive option plan, at a time when he knows those 
shares are actually worth more than the exercise price. 
A director who intentionally uses inside knowledge not 
available to shareholders in order to enrich employees 
while avoiding shareholder-imposed requirements 
cannot, in my opinion, be said to be acting loyally and in 
good faith as a fiduciary. 
Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592-93 (emphasis in original).11 At least one federal court 
faced with substantially identical allegations is in agreement. Ausikaitis, 962 F. 
11 Courts across the country have routinely found that corporate fiduciaries who 
engage in another form of manipulating the price of equity awards to take 
advantage of a low stock price referred to as "backdating" have breached their 
fiduciary duties. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357-58 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(finding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary where the complaint 
alleged that corporate fiduciaries granted and/ or received backdated stock 
options); Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28, 40 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying motion to 
dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim where complaint alleged that corporate 
fiduciaries granted and/or received backdated stock options) ; In re THQ, Inc. 
Derivative Litig., No. BC 357600, 2007 WL 4990689, at *3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 11, 2007) (same); Edmonds v. Getty, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1276-77 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007) (same); Belova v. Sharp, No. CV 07-299-MO, 2008 WL 700961, at 
*8 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2008) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of 
fiduciary where the complaint alleged that corporate fiduciaries granted and/or 
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Supp. 2d at 679.12 Utah should follow these decisions and hold that the spring-
loading of equity awards to directors and officers of a Utah corporation 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. 
B. The Instant Action Is Nearly Identical to Tyson, Weiss, and 
CytRx, All of Which Upheld Claims for Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Arising from Allegations of Spring-Loading 
The allegations in the present action are nearly identical to the successful 
pleadings in Tyson, Weiss, and CytRx. In Tyson, the plaintiffs alleged that on 
four occasions between 1999 and 2003, "[d]ays before Tyson would issue press 
releases that were very likely to drive stock prices higher, the Compensation 
Committee would award options to key employees." Tyson, 919 A.2d at 576. For 
example, the plaintiffs alleged that on September 19, 2003, the Tyson 
compensation committee granted stock options to a number of executives and 
directors at $13.33 per share. Id. On September 23, 2003, Tyson announced that 
its earnings would exceed Wall Street's expectations, and its stock price increased 
to $14.25. Id. The court held that this conduct constituted a "deception" because 
the compensation committee authorized the stock options with a market-value 
strike price when they knew those shares were actually worth more than the 
received backdated stock options); In re Atmel Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 06-
4592-JF (HRL), 2008 WL 2561957, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008) (same); 
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Olofson, No. 08-2344-CM, 2009 WL 1580296, at 
*lo (D. Kan. June 3, 2009) (same). 
12 Allegations of spring-loading of equity awards, which resulted in false and 
misleading financial statements because of their effect on the company's reported 
compensation expense, have also been held to be sufficient to state claims for 
violations of federal securities laws. See Hall v. The Children's Place Retail 
Stores, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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market value. Id. at 592-93. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs had 
adequately stated a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and denied 
the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 593. 
Similarly, in Weiss, the plaintiff alleged that the directors of Linear 
Technology Corporation ("Linear") granted spring-loaded stock options to 
various recipients "just prior to the quarterly earnings release" when the directors 
knew "the quarterly earnings release contained material information expected to 
drive up the market price of Linear's shares." Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439. Following 
the reasoning set forth in Tyson, the court in Weiss held that these allegations 
stated a claim against the defendants for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
Id. at443. 
Finally, m CytRx, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant directors 
attended a board meeting during which they were informed that an important 
clinical trial relating to the company's primary drug had received positive and 
"transformational" results, which was the most important news in the company's 
history. Id. at 29:1-15. The very next day, the compensation committee granted 
to themselves and their fellow directors options to purchase stock with an 
exercise price of $2.39 per share, which was the trading price of the company's 
stock at the time. Id. at 29:16-20. The information regarding the clinical trial 
was not yet public when the options were granted. Id. at 29:20-23. The following 
day, the company issued a press release touting the positive results of the trials, 
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which over the course of two days sent the stock price up to a two-year high of 
$6.12 per share. Id. at 30:2-8. The court summarized the allegations as follows: 
So just to review, December 9th, you find out about these 
great transformational results. December 10th, before 
the results are disclosed and at a time when you know 
these results are confidential and that the information is 
not public, you grant yourself and your senior officers 
approximately 3 million options at a strike price 
reflecting the price of the stock without any market 
knowledge of this information. And then the next day, 
you release the information, and then, indeed, the stock 
price spikes. 
Id. at 30:9-19. The court observed that "[i]t really would be difficult to design a 
fact pattern that would more graphically capture what spring-loading is all about. 
It's almost like a law school hypothetical. ... " Id. at 39:18-21. Accordingly, the 
court held that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the 
granting directors. Id. at 40:2. 
The allegations in the Complaint in this case are indistinguishable from 
those in Tyson, Weiss, and CytRx. First, the Complaint alleges that the SSARs 
were granted pursuant to the Plan, which was approved by USANA's stockholders 
and contained express restrictions on the exercise price of equity awards granted 
thereunder. (R. 10-11); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 442. Second, 
the Complaint alleges that the Compensation Committee members (Anciaux, 
McClain and Poelman) knew USANA was about to announce quarterly and year-
end earnings that would cause the Company's stock price to increase. Indeed, on 
the day of the SSAR grants they attended a meeting of the Audit Committee at 
which they reviewed the Company's financial statements. (R. 14, 22-23); Tyson, 
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919 A.2d at 593; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 442-43; CytRx, Tr. at 29:9-15. Third, the 
Complaint alleges that the Compensation Committee members approved the 
spring-loaded SSARs with the intent to circumvent the stockholder-approved 
restriction that the exercise price of the SSARs be equal to the fair market value 
of USANA stock as of the date of the grant. (R. 14-17); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; 
Weiss, 948 A.2d at 443; CytRx, Tr. at 29:16-30:19. As the Delaware Court of 
Chancery held in Tyson, "[s]uch allegations would satisfy a plaintiffs 
requirement to show adequately at the pleading stage that a director acted 
disloyally and in bad faith." Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; see also Weiss, 948 A.2d at 
443 ("These particularized allegations support an inference that the Director 
Defendants granted spring-loaded ... options."); Ausikaitis, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
679 ("[P]laintiff has pled particularized facts that give rise to an inference that the 
directors intentionally violated the Compensation Plans, which would be a breach 
of the fiduciary duty ofloyalty.").13 
13 The district court did not separately address Rawcliffe's breach of duty claims 
against the recipients of the spring-loaded SSARs. Such claims have also been 
consistently upheld by the Delaware courts. In Weiss, the court held: 
Weiss has also stated a claim [for breach of fiduciary duty] against 
the Officer Defendants and Maier for receiving the challenged 
grants. Here, the complaint alleges that these individuals knew or, 
absent recklessness, should have known that the grants violated the 
stockholder-approved option plans. Under the liberal pleading 
standards of this court, this knowledge may be averred generally. 
Such allegations, taken as true, support an inference that the Officer 
Defendants and Maier, via their receipt of the options, 
breached their fiduciary duties. 
Id. at 449 (emphasis added). See also CytRx, Tr. at 41:13-18 ("When you engage 
in behavior that, based on the allegation of the complaint, appears self-interested 
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C. The Terms of the Plan Do Not Permit Spring-Loading 
The district court's dismissal of the Complaint was based in large part on 
its conclusion that the Compensation Committee complied with the literal terms 
of the Plan. See R. 611 ("All of the February 2014 SSARs grants complied with the 
terms of the Plan"); R. 612 ("It is undisputed that the Members of the 
Compensation Committee complied with the terms of the Plan when they issued 
the February 2014 SSARs"); R. 613 ("The facts alleged in the Complaint confirm 
that the Compensation Committee followed the Plan when it granted the 
February 2014 SSARs"); R. 615 ("In it [sic] undisputed that the SSARs were 
issued at the then-current trading price ... as expressly permitted in the Plan"); 
id. ("the SSARs were issued consistent with the Plan, at their publicly traded 
share price"). Specifically, the Plan required that the exercise price of stock 
appreciation rights "shall not be less than 100% of Fair Market Value on the date 
of grant," which the Plan defines as the then-current trading price of USANA 
common stock. (R. 11). The district court held that because the exercise price of 
the SSARs granted on February 3, 2014 was equal to the trading price of the 
Company's stock on that date, the Compensation Committee members complied 
such that you give yourself assets for less than their fair value, that's classic 
breach of the duty of loyalty stuff. So Count III [against the recipients of the 
spring-loaded equity awards] certainly states a claim.") Here, as in Weiss and 
CytRx, Rawcliffe alleges that the Directors and Officers knew the SSARs were 
improperly spring-loaded because they too were aware of the Company's positive 
financial results that would undoubtedly cause the trading price to rise once 
public. (R. 15, 25-26). Thus, Rawcliffe states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
against the Directors and Officers as recipients of the SSARs. Weiss, 948 A.2d at 
449; CytRx, Tr. at 41:17-18. 
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with the Plan and therefore cannot be held accountable for breach of their 
fiduciary duties despite knowing that USANA's stock price would likely increase 
significantly the next day once they disclosed the inside information they 
possessed at the time they made the grants. 
The district court's holding misses entirely the problem with sprmg-
loading, which is a way for corporate fiduciaries to circumvent a plan's 
requirement that equity awards be granted at fair market value by using non-
public, inside information to manipulate "fair market value" to benefit 
themselves. As explained in CytRx: 
Basically, what the allegation is, is that the directors 
found a way to give themselves dollars for 25 cents. In 
other words, the stock at the time, because of the 
transformational news that they knew and the 
market didn't, had a fair market value far 
greater than the $2.39 strike price. Indeed, it 
ultimately went up to 7-ish bucks a share. But because 
they used the market price where the market did not 
know about this information, they were able to price the 
options for approximately 25 percent or a third of that. 
So they got dollars for 25 cents or 33 cents. 
CytRx, Tr. at 40:11-22 (emphasis added). If the market had the same 
information the Directors and Officers had on the day the SSARs were awarded, 
the market price would have been significantly higher, as evidenced by the fact 
that once the market received the positive information, USANA's stock price 
jumped to $68-46. (R. 13). Accordingly, the true "fair market value" of USANA 
stock on the day the SSARs were awarded was "far greater" than the $57.62 
exercise price, which was based on the price of USANA stock as determined by 
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the market without the benefit of the inside information the Directors and 
Officers knew. See CytRx, Tr. at 40:13-16. Indeed, as the Court held in CytRx, 
once the insiders were in possession of potentially market-moving news, they 
were obligated to postpone granting any equity awards until after the market 
absorbed the relevant information and the stock price was reflective of the actual 
market value. Id. at 38:2-11, 38:18-39:3. 
In reaching its conclusion, the district court incorrectly distinguished the 
instant action from Tyson and Weiss on the grounds that USANA's Plan required 
equity awards to be granted at the then-current trading price. (R. 615). In fact, 
in Tyson and Weiss, each of the companies had stockholder-approved equity 
incentive plans with provisions requiring the granting of incentive options at the 
market value-just like USANA. See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 575 n.15 (under the 
terms of Tyson's stock incentive plan, "[t]he exercise price of an incentive stock 
option may not be less than the fair market value of the Class A Common Stock 
on the date of the grant"); Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439 (under the terms of Linear's 
stockholder-approved option plan, "the per Share exercise price shall be no less 
than 100% of the Fair Market Value per Share on the date of the grant" with 
"'Fair Market Value' [] defined as the closing bid price for Linear's stock ... on 
the date the options are granted"). Even though the options at issue in those 
cases were granted with an exercise price equal to the trading price of the 
respective company's common stock on the dates of the grants, the courts held 
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that the grants violated the spirit and intent of the plans' requirement that the 
exercise price be equal to fair market value. As explained in Tyson: 
Granting spring-loaded options, without explicit 
authorization from shareholders, clearly involves an 
indirect deception. A director's duty of loyalty includes 
the duty to deal fairly and honestly with the 
shareholders for whom he is a fiduciary. It is 
inconsistent with such a duty for a board of directors to 
ask for shareholder approval of an incentive stock 
option plan and then later to distribute shares to 
managers in such a way as to undermine the very 
objectives approved by shareholders. This remains 
true even if the board complies with the strict 
letter of a shareholder-approved plan as it 
relates to strike prices or issue dates. 
Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592-93 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court 
improperly distinguished Weiss and Tyson on this basis. In the instant action, 
just like in Tyson and Weiss, although the Compensation Committee complied 
with the "strict letter" of the Plan by granting the SSARs at the February 3 trading 
price, because the Compensation Committee was in possession of material 
nonpublic information that it knew would cause USANA's stock price to rise, the 
Compensation Committee "undermine[d] the very objectives" of the Plan. Id. 
D. The Practice of Spring-Loading Is Not Protected by the 
Business Judgment Rule 
The district court also held that spring-loading is protected by the business 
judgment rule. (R. 612-14). Delaware courts have expressly rejected this 
conclusion. Specifically, in Weiss, the court stated: 
Although the defendants are correct that compensation 
decisions are typically protected by the business 
judgment rule, the rule applies to the directors' grant of 
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options pursuant to a stockholder-approved plan only 
when the terms of the plan at issue are adhered 
to. Thus, as the court held in [Tyson], allegations in a 
complaint rebut the business judgment rule where they 
support an inference that the directors intended to 
violate the terms of stockholder-approved option plans. 
Weiss, 948 A.2d at 441-42 (emphasis added). Specifically, "a claim of spring-
loading" successfully "rebut[s] the business judgment rule" if: 
(1) the plaintiff establishes that the challenged grants 
were given pursuant to an options plan, and (2) the 
plaintiff establishes that directors who approved the 
grants (a) possessed material non-public information 
soon to be released that would affect the company's 
share price, and (b) issued options with an intent to 
circumvent otherwise valid stockholder-approved 
restrictions upon the exercise price of the options. 
Id. at 441 n.21 (citing Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593 & n.75). In both Tyson and Weiss, 
the courts found that facts identical to those alleged here met the above test, and 
accordingly the defendants' conduct was not protected by the business judgment 
rule. See Weiss, 948 A.2d at 444; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593 ("Such allegations ... 
satisfy a plaintiffs requirement to show adequately at the pleading stage that a 
director acted disloyally and in bad faith and is therefore unable to claim the 
protection of the business judgment rule."). 
The Compensation Committee members' intent to circumvent the exercise 
price restrictions is demonstrated by their historical manipulation of the timing 
of equity award grants, by consistently granting equity awards before the release 
of information expected to increase the trading price of USANA's stock, and after 
the release of information expected to decrease the trading price. (R. 15-16). 
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Thus, the Compensation Committee's granting of the spring-loaded SSARs is not 
protected by the business judgment rule. 
The district court relied on DeSimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 
2007), to support its holding that the Directors and Officers' conduct was 
protected by the business judgment rule. (R. 613). However, DeSimone is 
distinguishable from the instant case on several grounds. First, in DeSimone the 
Delaware Court of Chancery expressly recognized the existence of a "claim of 
disloyalty under the theory articulated in Tyson, which is that directors breach 
their fiduciary duties if they approve spring-loaded or bullet-dodging options in a 
bad faith effort to circumvent stockholder-approved restrictions on the exercise 
price of options," id. at 944, but dismissed the complaint because in DeSimone 
(unlike in Tyson, Weiss, CytRx, Ausikaitis, and the present action), "below-
market options were expressly permitted by the Incentive Plan. Therefore, 
there were no rigid exercise price restrictions to circumvent." Id. (emphasis 
added).14 The plaintiff in DeSimone also failed to allege that any of the directors 
who approved the awards were aware of the forthcoming positive information, 
and no such inference could be drawn because the information was released 
weeks later and the stock price went down before it went up. Id. at 945. The 
court in DeSimone further noted that the challenged options were granted by 
disinterested directors, id. at 946, unlike here, where Anciaux, McClain, and 
14 The Delaware Court of Chancery specifically rejected DeSimone as "clearly 
distinguishable" from the facts at issue in CytRx, which are identical to the facts 
in this action. CytRx, Tr. at 39:15-17. 
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Poelman granted the spring-loaded SSARs to themselves as well as other 
recipients, and thus are anything but disinterested. (R. 2, 13-14).15 Indeed, even 
if the grants had not been spring-loaded, the Compensation Committee members' 
grants of SSARs to themselves would not be protected by the business judgment 
rule because they are not disinterested in their own grants. See Telxon Corp. v. 
Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 265 (Del. 2002) ("Like any other interested transaction, 
directoral self-compensation decisions lie outside the business judgment rule's 
presumptive protection"); see also, Calma v. Templeton, 114 A.3d 563, 578 (Del. 
Ch. 2015) (holding that a compensation committee's approval of equity awards to 
themselves and other directors "were conflicted decisions because all three 
members of the Compensation Committee received some of the RSU Awards" 
and thus was not protected by the business judgment rule); Valeant Pharm. Int'l 
v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 745 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("Where the self-compensation 
involves directors or officers paying themselves bonuses, the court is particularly 
cognizant to the need for careful scrutiny" and therefore "[s]elf-interested 
compensation decisions made without independent protections" are subject to 
higher scrutiny under the entire fairness standard as opposed to the deferential 
business judgment rule). 
15 In re 3COM Corp. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 25, 1999), on which the district court also relied, (R. 613), did not even 
involve allegations of spring-loading, bullet-dodging or similar manipulation of 
the timing of equity grants. Rather, the plaintiffs there simply alleged that the 
amounts of the equity grants awarded to the defendant directors were excessive. 
Accordingly, 3COM is not applicable to the instant case. 
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E. The Fact that the SSARs Had Not Yet Vested Is Irrelevant 
The district court also held that the Complaint failed to state a claim 
because the SSARs would not vest until January 2016 for the directors and 
August 2016 to August 2017 for the officers. Specifically, the district court stated 
that "even in light of allegations that the stock price jumped just after the 
February 3, 2014 SSARs were issued, this should not form the basis for a breach 
of fiduciary duty or malfeasance claim when the value of the SSARs will be based 
on stock values at the dates of potential exercise at least 23 to 42 months later." 
(R. 614). This position has also been rejected by Delaware law, which squarely 
holds that, "if there is a wrong, it occurs at the moment the stock option is 
granted." Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 267 (Del. Ch. 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
The defendants in Weiss attempted to argue that the long vesting schedule 
of the spring-loaded options was a basis for dismissal, and the court, relying on a 
similar holding in Tyson, rejected that argument: 
the Tyson court already rejected the defendants' 
argument regarding vesting as a basis for granting the 
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. As 
that court noted, "recipients of options are generally 
unable to benefit financially from [options] until a 
vesting period has elapsed, and thus an option's value to 
an executive employee is of less immediate value than 
an equivalent grant of cash." ... Nonetheless, the Tyson 
court held that such grants may represent a breach of 
fiduciary duty .... 
Weiss, 948 A.2d at 447 (citing Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592 n.75). This holding makes 
sense because the value of an option or SSAR is in the difference between the 
exercise price of the instrument and the market price of the stock when the 
instrument is exercised, and a lower exercise price reduces the amount of price 
appreciation necessary for the instrument to be "in the money" regardless of the 
vesting schedule. In this case, as a result of their artificially low exercise price, 
upon vesting the SSARs could be "in the money" even if USANA's stock price is 
lower than it was on February 5, 2014, which would completely defeat the 
purpose of stock appreciation rights. 
Likewise, the fact that the SSARs have not yet been exercised is of no 
consequence. As the Delaware Court of Chancery held in Weiss, "the defendants 
retain something of value-the challenged options-at the expense of the 
corporation. Nothing suggests that the defendants are prevented from exercising 
their options once they fully vest." Id. at 450 (denying motion to dismiss because 
"'one can imagine a situation where [the defendants] exercise[] the options and 
benefit[] from the low exercise price."' (quoting Ryan, 918 A.2d at 361)). Indeed, 
the SSARs, even if not vested, have a monetary value. The Directors and Officers 
have the ability to pledge or sell their SSARs even before they vest, and 
economists and compensation experts have developed methods for valuing 
unvested and unexercised options, such as the Black-Scholes method, which 
USANA and other corporations routinely use to value equity awards when 
reporting them in the Company's SEC filings. As the CytRx Court explained, the 
fact that the defendants had not yet exercised the improperly granted equity 
awards was irrelevant to determining whether they had breached their fiduciary 
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duties: "Like even guys who rob a bank know how to lay low for a while and not to 
go out and spend a bunch of money that would call attention to themselves. I 
mean, it's sort oflike shooting up a flare if you do that, isn't it?" CytRx, Tr. 19:16-
20. 
II. THE COMPLAINT STATES CLAIMS AGAINST THE DIRECTORS 
AND OFFICERS FOR CORPORATE WASTE AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
The district court further erred in holding that Rawcliffe's "claims for 
corporate waste and unjust enrichment are conclusory" and "without supporting 
factual allegations." (R. 616). 
To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) a 
benefit has been conferred on one person by another; (2) the recipient 
appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the recipient accepted or 
retained the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
recipient to retain the benefit without payment of its value. See, e.g., Desert 
Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, iii! 13-16, 12 P.3d 580. The 
Complaint easily satisfies these elements. It alleges that the Compensation 
Committee caused the Company to confer a benefit-the improperly spring-
loaded SSARs-on the Directors and Officers. (R. 2, 13-15, 26). The Complaint 
further alleges that the Directors and Officers had knowledge of this benefit. (R. 
12-15, 23, 26). Additionally, the Complaint alleges that it would be inequitable to 
allow the Directors and Officers to retain the spring-loaded SSARs. (R. 26). 
Multiple courts have refused to dismiss unjust enrichment claims against the 
recipients of spring-loaded equity awards based on identical allegations. See 
CytRx, Tr. at 41:19-42:4; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 449-50; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 602-03; 
Ausikaitis, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 680; see also, Ryan, 918 A.2d at 361 (refusing to 
dismiss unjust enrichment claims against the recipients of backdated stock 
options). As discussed above at page 28, the CytRx court explained that the 
defendants used the market price of the company's stock-when the market did 
not have the "transformational news" that the defendants had-to price the 
options for approximately 25-33% of what they would have been priced at had 
the market known of the news. CytRx, Tr. at 40:10-22. With respect to the 
plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim against the recipients of the stock options, the 
CytRx court stated "[w]hen you get dollars for whatever it works out to be, 25 
cents, 33 cents, because you priced at the market when you hadn't told the 
market about this transformational information, you're unjustly enriching 
yourself. So Count IV states a claim." Id. at 41:24-42:4. Likewise, here, the 
Directors and Officers received options that should have had an exercise price of 
$68-46 but actually had an exercise price of $57.62. Accordingly, the Directors 
and Officers were unjustly enriched. 
The district court further held that "the Complaint nowhere suggests that 
any of the Defendants who received the SSARs did little or no work for USANA or 
were otherwise not deserving of compensation for their services" and that the 
Directors and Officers were indeed entitled to compensation for their services. 
(R. 616). This holding mischaracterizes Rawcliffe's allegations. Rawcliffe does 
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not allege that the Directors and Officers were not entitled to receive 
compensation for their roles at USANA, nor does he allege that the Directors and 
Officers were not entitled to receive SSARs at all. To the contrary, the Complaint 
acknowledges that the Plan expressly permits the Compensation Committee to 
grant properly priced SSARs and other types of equity awards to eligible 
participants. (R. 11). What Rawcliffe alleges, however, is that the Directors and 
Officers were not entitled to receive spring-loaded SSARs and that the 
Directors and Officers were unjustly enriched by the additional value they 
received as a result of the spring-loading, i.e., the $10.84 difference between the 
exercise price and the trading price after the market had reacted to the news. 
See, e.g., Weiss, 948 A.2d at 449 (explaining that spring-loading "ensures that 
the exercise price of a grantee's option is lower than it otherwise would be. Thus, 
upon exercise of the option, the grantee receives more value, and the company 
less, than he should."). The Compensation Committee members should have 
waited to grant the SSARs until after the positive news was released, or "tried to 
make a determination about what the fair market value was on that date, 
assuming full knowledge by a willing buyer and seller of all material information . 
. . . " CytRx Tr. at 38:2-11, 38:18-39:3. 
Finally, the Complaint alleges that Anciaux, McClain and Poelman, as 
members of the Compensation Committee, wasted the assets of USANA by 
granting the spring-loaded SSARs. (R. 25). As the Court explained in CytRx: 
Would an ordinary person swap dollars for 25 cents? 
No. An ordinary person, if you go up to them and say, 
"I've got $5. How about you give me $1," they're not 
going to do that deal. 
For fiduciaries to say, "Yes, we will do that deal" raises 
an inference of waste. That is the type of transaction 
that no reasonable person would agree to. 
CytRx, Tr. at 40:23-41:6. Rawcliffe does not allege that all grants of SSARs to 
the Directors and Officers would necessarily constitute waste, but only that the 
grant of spring-loaded SSARs constitutes waste because such grants are 
"approved without any valid corporate purpose." Weiss, 948 A.2d at 450. Thus, 
under CytRx and Weiss, Rawcliffe has adequately stated a claim for waste against 
the Compensation Committee members. 
III. AFFIRMING THE DISTRJCT COURT'S DECISION WOULD BE 
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY 
As stated above, the directors and officers of a Utah corporation "'must 
exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions touching their duties to the 
corporation and its property"' and must act in the best interests of the 
corporation and not for their own personal benefit. Glen Allen Mining, 77 Utah 
at 384-85 (quoting 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272). Such directors and officers 
'"are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their position."' Id. If this 
Court affirms the district court's holding, the directors and officers of Utah 
corporations will have no disincentive to engage in self-dealing through the 
manipulation of the timing of equity awards. Accordingly, the district court's 
decision should be reversed in the interests of public policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Rawcliffe respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the Amended Memorandum and the Final Judgment and remand 
this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of March 2016. 
MITCHELL BARLOW & 
MANSFIELD, P.C. 
J. Ryan Mitchell (9362) 
Steven J. Joffee (13258) 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
rmitchell@mbmlawyers.com 
Eric L. Zagar 
Robin Winchester 
Kristen L. Ross 
KESSLER TOPAZ 
MELTZER & CHECK, LLP 
280 King of Prussia Road 
Radnor, Pennsylvania 19087 
ezagar@ktmc.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
James Robert Rawcliffe 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(1) 
I hereby certify that: 
L This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. 
P. 24(f)(1) because this brief contains 10,436 words, excluding the parts of the 
brief exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1)(B). 
2. This brief also complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. 
App. P. 27(b) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface 
using Microsoft Word in 13-point Georgia. 
DATED this 24th day of March 2016. 
-41-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of March 2016, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant and a CD containing a 
courtesy electronic copy of the foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant to be served 
via U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Erik A. Christiansen 
Alan S. Mouritsen 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
echristiansen@parsonsbehle.com 
Douglas A. Rappaport 
Lucy C. Malcom 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 
One Bryant Park 
New York, New York 10036 
darappaport@akingump.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees 
-42-
Addendum A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ROBERT RA WCLIFFE, 
derivatively on behalf of nominal defendant 
USANA HEAL TH SCIENCES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT ANCIAUX a/k/a ROBERT 
AUCIUX, JERRY G. MCCLAIN, 
RONALD S. POELMAN, JAMES H. 
BRAMBLE, JIM BROWN, GILBERT 
FULLER, KEVIN G. GUEST, DANIEL A. 
MACUGA, DA YID A. WENTZ, and 
DEBORAH WOO, 
Defendants, 
and 
USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 140905252 
Judge Keith A. Kelly 
Before the Com1 is Defendants ' October 2, 2014 Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs 
Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint ("Complaint"). Plaintiff opposed the Motion on 
November 13 , 2014, and Defendants submitted their reply on December 11, 2014. Plaintiff 
submitted supplemental authority on January 9, 2015 . The Court heard oral argument on January 
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23, 2015, and the Court took this matter under advisement. 
After hearing oral argument, the Court has analyzed the written arguments, case law, and 
the transcript of oral argument. Based upon these, the Court is convinced that Defendants' 
Motion is well taken and issues the following memorandum decision. 
The Court issued its original memorandum decision and order on March 18, 2015 in this 
matter. To clarify the Court's reasons for granting Defendants' Motion, the Court issues this 
amended memorandum decision, which supersedes the original memorandum decision. 
Legal Standard on This Motion to Dismiss 
This Motion to Dismiss focuses on the allegations of the Complaint. Defendants' 
principal arguments are brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides that the Court 
"may dismiss an action if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 
Osguth01pe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, ~ 20, 232 P.3d 999 (internal quotations 
omitted). A motion brought under Rule l 2(b )(6) '"admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on those facts."' Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 
UT 11, ~ 14, 203 P.3d 962 (quoting Oakwood Vil!. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ~ 8, 
104P.3d 1226). 
In considering a Rule l 2(b) Motion, this Court accepts the non-conclusory factual 
allegations of the Complaint as true, but is not bound to accept conclusory statements that are 
unsupported by underlying factual allegations. Affirming dismissal of conclus01y claims of fraud 
and breach of fiduciaiy duty, the Utah Court of Appeals recently explained: 
The sufficiency of the pleadings within a complaint 'must be determined by the facts 
pleaded rather than the conclusions stated.' Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ~ 26, 21 P.3d 198 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Foster v. Saunders, 2005 UT App 264, at para. 3, 2005 WL 1356799 (per 
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curiam). Here, [plaintiff's] complaint asserts that [defendants] breached their fiduciary 
duties to [plaintiff]. But the complaint does not allege any act [defendant] performed in 
furtherance of those breaches. [Plaintiff's] complaint claims only that [defendant] 
'actively participated ' in the breach. This allegation is purely conclusory rather than 
factual and is therefore insufficient to support a claim for relief. See Chapman v. Primmy 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989) (' We have stressed, and continue to 
hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of 
relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment.'). 
Accordingly, dismissal pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
was appropriate. 
Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, iJ 23 , 344 P.3d 156. In light of 
this authority, the Court examines the factual allegations of the Complaint - rather than 
conclusory labels - in determining whether Plaintiff has stated a claim. 
Plaintiff's allegations of option spring loading are fraud-based claims of "manipulating 
the granting of equity awards." (See Complaint iii! 45, 75-78 & 83-86.) Counsel for Plaintiff 
expressed this point in oral argument: "This is not a negligence case. We alleged bad faith. We 
allege intentional misconduct." (Transcript of Oral Argument ( 1/23/15) at p. 45 ("Argument 
Transcript" ).) 
Because allegations of option spring-loading sound in fraud, Plaintiff is required to plead 
his breach of fiduciary duty claims (I st and J rd claims) with the specificity required by Rule 9(b ). 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) (" In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."). Rule 9(b) " is not limited to allegations of 
common law fraud" but instead reaches "all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of 
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term ' fraud ' in its broadest 
dimension." State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, iJ 22, 282 P.3d 66 (applying heightened pleading 
standard of Rule 9(b) to plaintiff's claims under Utah False Claims Act) (internal citations and 
emphasis omitted). 
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This heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims for waste of 
corporate assets and unjust enrichment (2"<l and 4°1 claims) to the extent that those claims are not 
based upon allegations of fraudulent option spring loading. 
At oral argument, both sides agreed that, in addition to considering the allegations of the 
Complaint, the Court may take judicial notice of public documents such as SEC filings, as well 
as documents referenced in the Complaint, without converting this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Argument Transcript at pp. I 0 & 27; 
EMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ~~ 6-7, 322 P.3d 1172 (court could take judicial notice 
of document which was public record and also consider it as implicitly referenced in complaint); 
Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004UT101, ~ 13 , 104 P.3d 1226 (same). 
Claims Made in the Complaint 
Plaintiff filed the shareholder derivative Complaint on behalf of nominal defendant 
USANA Health Sciences, Inc. ("USANA" or the "Company") against certain of USANA' s 
executive officers and members of its Board of Directors (collectively " Individual Defendants). 
The Complaint claims that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty, wasted corporate assets 
and obtained unjust enrichment. The Complaint alleges that, in breach of their fiduciary duties 
owed to USANA, the members of the Board ' s Compensation Committee (the "Compensation 
Committee") knowingly and deliberately violated USANA' s stockholder-approved equity plan, 
the USANA Health Sciences, Inc. 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan (the "Plan"), a copy of 
which was attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. Specifically, the Complaint claims that the 
Compensation Committee knowingly and deliberately granted to themselves and other directors 
and officers of USANA a total of 309,483 stock-settled stock appreciation rights (" SSARs") that 
0607 
April 03, 2015 05:33 PM 4of14 
were "spring-loaded," in other words, granted just prior to the release of material information 
reasonably expected to drive the market price of the Company' s stock higher, thereby artificially 
increasing the value of the SSARs by establishing an artificially low exercise price. (Complaint 
iii! 1-3 .) 
The Complaint claims that the Compensation Committee granted the spring-loaded 
SSARs on February 3, 2014, when they knew that USANA was about to announce impressive 
financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended December 28, 2013 . These results were 
announced in a press release issued the very next day, February 4, 2014, after the market closed. 
The results had a favorable effect on USANA ' s stock price, which increased by 15 .8% the next 
day. Plaintiff claims that the timing of the SSARs on February 3rd was perfectly orchestrated to 
"spring-load" the grants in order to capitalize on the market's expected positive reaction to 
USANA's news. The Complaint asserts that Compensation Committee' s award of the spring-
loaded SSARs to themselves and other recipients constituted a waste of corporate assets and a 
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by the Compensation Committee to USANA and its 
stockholders, as well as unjust enrichment of and breach of fiduciary duty by the Individual 
Defendants. (Id. iii! 4-6, 23-43, 75-90.) 
The Complaint seeks rescission of the SSARs or, alternatively, to recover damages for 
the benefit of USANA and to compel the Individual Defendants to disgorge to USANA the 
benefits they have received from their SSARs. (Id. iii! 75-90 & A-E.) 
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The USANA Equity Incentive Award Plan 
In analyzing these claims, the Court considers the undisputed factual allegations 
concerning the issuance of the SSARs. In April 2006, USANA's shareholders adopted USANA's 
25-page Equity Incentive Award Plan (the "Plan") to govern the particulars ofUSANA's use of 
stock and other equity instruments in compensating and creating incentives for the Company's 
high-level personnel. (Complaint iii! 27, 28 & Exhibit A.) The Plan contemplates that USANA 
will use these incentive awards to attract highly desirable candidates as employees by 
maintaining "competitive compensation levels." (Id., Ex. A (Plan), at A-1.) It further provides 
that incentive awards will be used to retain talent by providing "an incentive to management and 
employees to remain in continuing employment with the Company." (Id.) The Plan contemplates 
that incentive awards will be used to "[ c] losely associate the interests of management, 
employees, directors and consultants . . . with the shareholders by reinforcing the relationship 
between participants' rewards and shareholder gains." (Id.) The Plan is thus structured to 
"[p ]rovide an incentive to management and employees ... to put forth maximum efforts for the 
success of its business." (Id.) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-624 ( 1992), the Plan grants extensive powers to the 
Committee to administer the Plan and issue awards pursuant to its terms. (Complaint, Ex. A 
(Plan) at A-18 .) The Committee has "the exclusive power, authority and discretion" to make all 
key decisions about awards. (Id. at A-19.) This discretion covers "the terms and conditions of 
any Award granted pursuant to the Plan, including, but not limited to, the exercise price, grant 
price or purchase price, any reload provision, [and] any restrictions or limitations on the Award." 
(Id.) The Plan also allows the Committee to "[d]ecide all other matters that must be determined 
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in connection with an Award." (Id. at A-20.) 
The Plan provides that the exercise price of incentive awards must be no less than the fair 
market value of the Company' s shares at the time of the grant. (Id. at A-10 (requiring that stock 
appreciation rights be granted at a price "no less than 100% of the Fair Market Value on the date 
of grant").) Absent some contrary determination made by the Committee, the fair market value 
for publicly traded stock "shall be .. . the mean between the highest and lowest selling price of a 
share of Common Stock on the principal exchange on which shares of Common Stock are then 
trading, if any, on that date, or if shares were not traded on such date, then on the closest 
preceding date on which a trade occurred . .. . " (Id. at A-3 (defining "Fair Market Value").) 
The Plan authorizes the use of various equity-based incentive awards, (Complaint ii 30), 
including stock appreciation rights ("SARs"). Such rights, when exercised, entitle the holder to 
receive the difference between the selected exercise price, which is based on the Company' s 
stock price at the time of issuance, and the trading price of the Company' s stock on the exercise 
date. (Id. ii 31 .) SARs are non-transferable and have no intrinsic monetary value prior to vesting. 
(See id. , Ex. A at A-15, part 10.3 .) SARs are distinct from more traditional "stock options" in 
that they do not require the recipient to pay an exercise price, but instead involve the issuance of 
stock or cash to the employee reflecting the difference between the SARs' issuance price and 
exercise price. When SARs are "in the money," the share price on the day of exercise exceeds 
the pre-set exercise price. Thus, the SA Rs ' payoff is a function of the Company' s stock price. 
Out-of-the-money SARs return no value to an exercising party. 
Issuance of the February 2014 SSARs 
The SARs in question are a form of stock appreciation rights known as SSARs. SSARs 
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are stock appreciation rights that pay the appreciation amount in stock rather than cash. SSARs 
cannot be exercised until they vest. 
On February 3, 2014, the Committee granted SSARs to certain senior executives, each of 
whom is named as an Individual Defendant in this action. (Complaint if 40.) Under the grants, 
the six Officer Defendants received between 32,500 and 58,500 SSARs, half of which were set 
to vest in August 2016, and half of which were set to vest in August 2017. (See id.; Malcolm 
Affidavit to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Exs. C - L (February 6, 2014 Form 4s for the 
Individual Defendants ("Form 4s")1).) The Committee also granted 12,000 SSARs each to the 
four Director Defendants, which were set to vest quarterly beginning in January 2016. (Id.) Thus, 
on their face, the SSARs would vest and provide value about 23 to 42 months after they were 
issued. 
Even though the Complaint references USANA's prior grants of SARs, the allegations in 
the Complaint that form the basis for the claims in this case are claims related to the February 3, 
2014 SSARs. (Complaint iii! 42-43 & 59.) 
All of the February 2014 SSARs grants complied with the terms of the Plan. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs counsel explained at oral argument that "the compensation committee complied with 
the letter of the plan. They granted the SSARs at the exercised - at the stock price on the day of 
the grant. So the letter of the plan they met." (Argument Transcript at p. 32.) 
The day after the Committee granted these awards, on February 4, 2014, USANA 
announced positive results for 2013. (Complaint iii! 34-38.) The Company's stock price rose the 
day after to a closing price of $68.46. (Id. if 39.) The issued SSARs were not vested, however, 
These SEC filings are public documents whose existence and content are undisputed. Thus, the Court takes 
judicial notice of these undisputed filings without converting this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment. 
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and would not vest for 23 to 42 months. (See Form 4s.) There is no allegation that this short-term 
stock price increase would guarantee or translate into long-term value for the SSARs. Under the 
terms of the Plan, those SSARs would only have value ifthe overall performance of USANA 
over the vesting period led to a sustained share price increase. 
Significantly, USANA filed Form 4s on February 6, 2014, fully disclosing the issuance of 
the SSARs just three days after they were issued. (Id.) There is no allegation that the Defendants 
hid or otherwise covered up the issuance of the SSA Rs. 
Plaintiff's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Fail Because 
the Compensation Committee Undisputedly Complied with the Terms of the Plan 
It is undisputed that the Members of the Compensation Committee complied with the 
terms of the Plan when they issued the February 2014 SSARs. Thus their actions are protected 
by the business judgment rule, and they did not breach their fiduciary duties. 
The Committee members ' conduct regarding the SSARs grants is governed by the 
business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, courts have "provided directors with 
broad discretion" and "have been reluctant to make hindsight judgments about corporate affairs." 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (D. Utah 1993); see also FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1979) (requiring directors to 
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence in administering the affairs of the corporation). In 
shielding directors from liability absent some basis for concluding that they acted willfully or 
with gross negligence, the Utah Code protects the actions of directors acting in good faith and 
with reasonable care. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-840(4) (1993); see also C & Y Corp. v. Gen. 
Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (identifying the Utah corporate statute as 
"codifying [the] business judgment rule"). 
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Courts have held that "director transactions made under a stock option plan approved by 
the corporate shareholders are entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule." In re 3COM 
C01p. S 'holders Litig. , 1999 WL 1009210, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) (granting motion to 
dismiss); see also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding no claim 
where directors followed "terms of .. . stockholder-approved option plan''). 
In this case, it is undisputed that USANA's shareholders adopted the Plan authorizing the 
Company to issue equity based incentive awards and to define the terms of such grants. 
(Complaint ii 27.) The facts alleged in the Complaint confirm that the Compensation Committee 
followed the Plan when it granted the February 2014 SSARs. The Plan specifically directs that 
SSARs granted under the Plan must have an exercise price that shall "not be less than 100% of 
Fair Market Value on the date of the grant." (Id. ii 32.) This exercise price is to be the "then-
current trading price" of USANA's stock. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that the Company granted 
the SSARs at issue on February 3, 2014. (Id. ii 40.) On February 3, 2014, the SSARs were issued 
with an exercise price of $57.62, the price ofUSANA's stock on the day of the grant. (Id.) The 
Committee therefore followed the shareholders' instructions in exercising the "exclusive power, 
authority and discretion" that shareholders gave them to set the terms of SSARs grants. (Plan at 
A-19.) Then, in three days, on February 6, 2014, USANA fully disclosed the issuance of the 
SSARs. (Form 4s.) Thus Plaintiff's counsel admitted during oral argument that "the 
compensation committee complied with the letter of the plan." (Argument Transcript at p. 32.) 
Nothing in the Utah corporate code prohibits a compensation committee from granting 
incentive compensation before announcing positive financial results . USANA' s shareholders did 
not impose any such limitation in the Plan; nor is there a provision in USANA's corporate 
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charter or bylaws that would prevent such an award . No other shareholder-imposed restriction 
governs the timing of SSARs awards. In all, there is nothing in Utah law or USANA' s corporate 
documents that would have given the Compensation Committee members any grounds to believe 
that they could be held personally liable for granting options before announcing earnings. To the 
contrary, the Plan gives the Compensation Committee broad discretion in issuing SSARs and 
expressly states: "No member of the Board or [Compensation] Committee shall be liable for any 
action taken or decision or determination made in good faith with respect to any Option, the 
Plan, or any award thereunder." (Complaint, Ex. A (Plan) at A-20, part 12.9.) 
Further, under their terms, the Officer Defendants ' SSARs will not vest until August 
2016 and August 2017, while the Director Defendants' SSARs will not vest until January 2016. 
(See Form 4s.) These long vesting periods mean that the short-term jump in share price 
immediately after issuance of the SSARs will only bring value to the Defendants if the 
Company' s positive performance is sustained for 23 to 42 months. Thus, the Court concludes 
that, even in light of allegations that the stock price jumped just after the February 3, 2014 
SSARs were issued, this should not form the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty or malfeasance 
claim when the value of the SSARs will be based on stock values at the dates of potential 
exercise at least 23 to 42 months later. 
Pla intiff cites cases in which trial courts have denied motions to dismiss breach of 
fiduciary duty claims that were based upon alleged spring loading of stock options. E.g., Weiss v. 
Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 441-48 (Del Ch. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty by approving spring-loaded stock options); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. 
Shareholder Litigation, 919 A.2d 563 , 592-93 (Del Ch. 2007) (same). The Tyson court held that 
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a claim of spring-loading rebutted the business judgment rule if (I) the plaintiff alleges that the 
challenged grants were given pursuant to an options plan, and (2) the plaintiff alleges that 
persons who approved the spring-loaded grants "(a) possessed material non-public information 
soon to be released that would affect the company's share price, and (b) issued those options with 
the intent to circumvent otherwise valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the exercise 
price of the options." 919 A.2d at 592 & n.75 ; see also Weiss, 948 A.2d at 441-42 & n.21. 
The test in Tyson and Weiss should not bar dismissal in this case. The USANA Plan 
specifically directs that SSARs granted under the Plan must have an exercise price that shall " not 
be less than 100% of Fair Market Value on the date of the grant," which is defined to be " the 
then-current trading price" of USANA ' s stock. (Complaint~ 32.) In it undisputed that the 
SSARs were issued at the then-current trading price (id. ~ 40) - as expressly permitted in the 
Plan. Since the SSARs were undisputedly issued consistent with this express provision, their 
issuance cannot be viewed as circumventing valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the 
exercise price of the SSARs. Thus, Plaintiff does not state a claim under the Tyson and Weiss test 
even in light of allegations that the Compensation Committee possessed material non-public 
information soon to be released that would affect USANA's share price. 
Further, Tyson, Weiss and the other trial court cases cited by Plaintiff are not binding on 
this Court. Those cases are not persuasive to the extent that they may be read to allow claims in 
circumstances such as those in the present case, where the undisputed facts show: (i) the SSARs 
were issued consistent with the Plan, at their publicly traded share price; (ii) their terms were 
publicly disclosed three days later in the Form 4s; and (iii) the SSARs could not be exercised for 
at least 23 to 42 months after they were issued . 
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As a result, this Court holds that the business judgment rule bars Plaintiffs breach of 
fiduciary duty claims as a matter of law under the undisputed factual allegations of this case. 
The Conclusory Corporate Waste and Unjust Enrichment 
Allegations Fail to State a Claim 
Plaintiffs claims for corporate waste and urtjust enrichment are conclusory. Plaintiff 
labels the SSARs as "spring loaded" and then alleges - without supporting factual allegations -
that those SSARs were provided for inadequate consideration and without valid corporate 
purpose, and that keeping them would be unjust and unconscionable. (Complaint iii! 80-81 & 88-
89.) 
As discussed above, the label "spring loaded" does not raise a claim under the undisputed 
facts of this case. At the same time, the Complaint nowhere suggests that any of the Defendants 
who received the SSARs did little or no work for USANA or were otherwise not deserving of 
compensation for their services. To the contrary, the Complaint makes clear that each of the 
Individual Defendants had substantial responsibilities and duties to perform at USANA, (id. 
iii! 12-21, 23-24 ), and that, under their watch, USA NA had outstanding financial performance, 
(id. iii! 34-3 8). Without facts (not conclusory allegations) supporting claims of corporate waste 
and unjust enrichment, and in light of the analysis of the "spring loading" claims discussed 
above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state claims for corporate waste and urtjust 
enrichment.2 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 
1. Final judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Robert Anciaux a/k/a Robert 
2 In light of the preceding analysis, the Couit does not reach other arguments raised by Defendants in 
support of their Motion to Dismiss. 
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Auciaux, Jen-y G. McClain, Ronald S. Poelman, James H. Bramble, Jim Brown, Gilbert Fuller, 
Kevin G. Guest, Daniel A. Macuga, David A. Wentz, and Deborah Woo, dismissing all of 
Plaintiff's causes of action; 
2. This action is hereby dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice; 
3. Defendants shall submit to the Court and serve upon Plaintiff an appropriate 
memorandum of costs within fourteen days of entry of this Judgment and consistent with the 
procedures set forth in Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In accordance with the Utah R. Civ. P. lO(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten 
signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic signature at the upper right-hand 
corner of the first page of this Order. 
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USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC., 
Appellee. 
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This Court has elected to retain the above-entitled appeal on its docket. 
The prior order of transfer to the Court of Appeals is vacated; however, the Court 
retains its discretion to transfer the appeal at a later time if circumstances 
warrant. Unless otherwise notified, the parties shall file all future pleadings in 
the Supreme Court. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
JAMES ROBERT RA WCLIFFE, 
Derivatively on Behalf of Nominal 
Defendant USANA HEAL TH SCIENCES, 
INC., 
. Plaintiff/Appellant, 
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ROBERT ANCIAUX a/k/a ROBERT ) 
AUCIAUX, JERRY G. MCCLAIN, ) 
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DEBORAH WOO, ) 
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Defendants/ Appellees, ) 
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) USANA HEAL TH SCIENCES, INC., 
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APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM 
ADDRESSING SUPREME COURT'S 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Case No. 20150365-SC 
Dist. Ct. No. 140905252 
Appellant James Robert Rawcliffe ("Appellant"), by and through his undersigned 
counsel of record, hereby submits the following memorandum addressing the Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal as requested by the Court in its July 22, 2015 Order (the 
"Order"). 
In its Order, the Court informed the parties that it was considering, sua sponte, 
whether it must dismiss this appeal because it lacks appellate jurisdiction. Specifically, 
the Court questioned whether the district court's April 3, 2015 Amended Memorandum 
Decision and Final Judgment of Dismissal (the "Final Judgment of Dismissal") was a 
final, appealable order under Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
invited the parties to address this issue and explain why the appeal should or should not 
be dismissed. · Although Appellant believes the language employed by the district court 
demonstrates clearly that it intended its Final Judgment of Dismissal to be a final, 
appealable order, Appellant concedes the Final Judgment of Dismissal is technically not 
final under Rule 7(f)(2) in light of this Court's decision in Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District v. King, 2013 UT 13, 297 P .3 d 619. In King, the Court held that "a 
district court that intends its ruling to represent its final, appealable order must explicitly 
state that no additional order is necessary" otherwise its decision is not final or appealable 
under Rule 7(f)(2). Id.ii ii 24-25 . 
. Measured against the King decision'.s strict, bright-li~e standard, the Fi.nal 
Judgment of Dismissal falls short because although the district court designated its 
decision as a final judgment and explicitly stated "that final judgment is entered in favor 
of Defendants ... dismissing all of Plaintiffs causes of action," it did not explicitly state 
that no additional order was necessary and it did not include any directive for the 
preparation of a final version of the decision. Because the district court's Final Judgment 
of Dismissal fails to include the explicit language required by the King decision, this 
appeal is not ripe because it was not taken from a final, appealable order. 1 Appellant 
therefore respectfully requests that its appeal be dismissed without prejudice for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction and remanded to the district court with directions to enter a final, 
appealable order in accordance with Rule 7(f)(2).ofthe Rules of Civil Procedure . 
. DATED this 51h day of August, 2015. 
1 Appellant is aware that on May 12, 2015, the Supreme Court adopted amendments to 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that will do away with the strict, bright-line 
standard mandated by the current version of rule 7(f)(2) and the Court's decision in King. 
Under the amended Rule 7, the district court's Final Judgment of Dismissal would satisfy 
the necessary requirements of a final, appealable order removing any question as to the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction over this appeal. And while Appellant believes judicial 
efficiency and economy would best be s~rved by analyzing Vl'.hether .the Final Judgment 
of Dismissal is a final, appealable order against the requirements of the amended Rule 7, 
Appellant understands that the amendments do not become effective until November 1, 
2015. Accordingly, unless the Court decides to send its King decision into early 
retirement, the decision remains controlling precedent. 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
Honor. 
How are you? 
THE COURT: Welcome, everyone. 
ALL COUNSEL: Good morning, Your 
THE COURT: Mr. Welch, good morning. 
MR. WELCH: I'm well, Your Honor. 
7 Thank you. 
8 If I might, I'd appreciate the 
9 opportunity to introduce to the Court my partner and 
10 friend Allen Lanstra from our Los Angeles office who 
11 will be making the argument to the Court, with the 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Court's permission. 
THE COURT: Great. Welcome to the 
East Coast. I'm sorry we don't have much better 
weather for you. 
MR. WELCH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. DELEEUW: Good morning, 
Your Honor. Brad deLeeuw, Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess on behalf of plaintiffs. I'd just like to 
introduce my co-counsel seated at counsel table. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. DELEEUW: Robin Winchester of 
23 Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, Philip Taylor of 
24 Abraham Fruchter & Twersky, and we also have Kevin 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
4 
Davenport from the Prickett firm. 
THE COURT: Great. Welcome to all of 
you. 
MR. DELEEUW: With Your Honor's 
permission, Ms. Winchester will handle the argument 
the motion to dismiss today, and Mr. Taylor will 
handle the argument on the motion to stay. 
on 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. DELEEUW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Please go ahead. 
MR. LANSTRA: Good morning again, Your 
Honor. I'd like to start with the motion to stay. 
There's a factual overlap between the 
allegations in the securities action in California and 
the derivative action here. The factual allegations 
require both cases to call for the determination of 
questions of fact concerning both spring-loaded stock 
options and the stock promotions through the 
DreamTeamGroup. The prosecution of both of those 
cases simultaneously, we believe, will prejudice the 
corporation. 
While the derivative plaintiffs will 
be seeking answers to questions on behalf of the 
24 corporation, the securities plaintiffs will be seeking 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
0517 
1 answers against the corporation. One will be 
2 attempting to undermine the credibility of witnesses 
3 and the other relying on the veracity of those 
witnesses. 
5 
4 
5 The derivative action here, if it were 
6 to go forward simultaneously, could result in an 
7 imputation of liability of the officers to the 
8 corporation in the securities action. 
9 I want to make clear, as everyone 
10 reads the briefs and comes back out to argue the 
11 cases, I picked up perhaps the suggestion that the 
12 
13 
14 
plaintiffs believe we are asking the Court to delete 
this case. 
this case. 
We are not asking for the Court to delete 
We're asking just to hit the pause button 
15 and allow the securities action to go forward. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
We think there's good reasons why the 
securities action should be the one that goes forward 
as opposed to the derivative action. The securities 
action is broader. It is setting forth an allegation 
of a broad scheme that sweeps into it allegations of 
not only the spring-loading of the stock option grants 
but the stock promotion. 
They're arguing that there's an 
24 artificial inflation of the stock, it's related to a 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
6 
secondary offering, and that the directors and the 
officers are attempting to capitalize on it. The lead 
plaintiff there has allegedly over a million dollars 
in losses so he's a real plaintiff, and he's going to 
be obligated or certainly interested in pushing 
forward with all might. 
There's a broader range of dates 
involved in California as well. Depending on who 
9 characterizes the derivative complaint here, we could 
10 
11 
12 
13 
be talking about a window of three days of events. We 
could also be arguing from about October all the way 
until about March. That range is within the range and 
the allegations of spring-loading and the DreamTeam 
14 are all combined or a part of the securities action in 
15 California. 
16 I think, in short, both cases will 
17 call for the determination of substantially the same 
18 questions of fact, and we think that that causes not 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
only a conflict that will prejudice the corporation 
but will also be a waste of resources, I think, in our 
opinion. 
I don't know if you have any 
THE COURT: 
the federal action. 
Remind me of the status of 
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1 MR. LANSTRA: The defendants have 
2 moved to dismiss, Your Honor. That briefing is not 
3 
4 
5 
complete. 
February. 
I believe the briefing will be complete in 
There are derivative cases as well. And 
I'm not sure how much it's set forth in the briefs, 
6 but there were three cases in Delaware or in 
7 California that were filed derivatively. 
8 One of them, we were able to convince 
9 the plaintiff to withdraw the case and dismiss it 
10 based on a forum selection clause because we believe 
11 that the derivative cases should be handled here when 
12 they're taken care of. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
And the other two cases, handled by 
the same counsel, they don't agree with the forum 
selection clause, so they're fighting it out. That 
has been fully briefed before Chief Judge King in the 
Central District. He has indicated he will not take 
oral argument, so the opinion on that could come any 
day. 
To be clear, we believe that this is 
the place for those cases. We have moved in the 
22 alternative for a stay of the California derivative 
7 
23 cases for this action as well as a stay for the class. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
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1 Do you want to go ahead and address 
2 the other motions or take them one by one? 
3 I guess since they're splitting it up, 
4 why don't we focus on the stay for now, and I'll have 
5 you back. 
6 
7 
8 
Your Honor. 
MR. LANSTRA: 
MR. TAYLOR: 
Certainly. Thank you, 
Good morning, Your Honor. 
9 Philip Taylor. I think I'll just address first the 
10 factual overlap that the defendants speak of. I think 
11 this Court addressed in the Molycorp litigation that 
12 the factual overlap between a federal and a derivative 
13 case shouldn't cause a stay to be put in place here in 
14 Delaware. 
15 I think Vice Chancellor Noble said 
16 that "It's almost foreseeable that directors of 
17 Delaware corporations might be called to defend both 
18 securities and derivative actions based on the same 
19 factual basis." 
20 So we really don't believe that this 
21 
22 
23 
factual overlap should cause a stay. And that is 
especially true because the claims, we believe, here 
of our are quintessentially Delaware claims. The meat 
24 action is really Delaware, Delaware claims, whereas 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
0521 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
the federal claims are disclosure-based claims. We're 
look at the Delaware fiduciaries -- excuse me -- the 
compensation practices of Delaware fiduciaries. And 
these have been described as questions of great import 
to Delaware law. 
As defendants point out, they have a 
7 Delaware forum selection clause which requires all 
8 such types of actions, claims, to be brought here in 
9 
10 
Delaware. They agreed that the claims should be 
litigated here in Delaware. And, really, the only 
11 prejudice that's going to be suffered is by delaying 
12 plaintiffs' litigation of these claims. 
13 There's no indemnity claims pled in 
14 our case, so there's no practical considerations to 
15 hold off litigating the claims because of how the 
16 federal securities litigation turns out. 
17 The other practical considerations 
18 with respect to the facts that are going to be 
19 developed in this case, a lot of the key facts that 
20 they're concerned about, we've already obtained in the 
21 
22 
23 
24 
220 documents. So I don't think that there's any 
practical considerations in terms of overlapping 
discovery. 
We actually were the first plaintiffs 
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1 to assert the spring-loading claim, so the 
2 spring-loading claims only came up in the federal 
3 securities actions after they were asserted here in 
4 Delaware. 
10 
5 And the DreamTeam and stock promotion 
6 claims, they're pled in our complaint as background 
7 simply to show further evidence of defendants' history 
8 of dishonesty to shareholders. 
9 THE COURT: Do you really need me to 
10 get into any of that? 
11 
12 
13 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, I guess that's 
really up to you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, it's up to you 
14 because you're going to be the one who, if this goes 
15 forward, is conducting discovery and that sort of 
16 thing. I mean, part of what your friend says is that 
17 there's this bigger scheme concept out in California 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
about pumping up stock, et cetera. Are you going to 
be exploring things about that or asking me to make 
rulings on things like that? 
MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, our claims 
are really based on the spring-loading of the options, 
so those facts are really minor, like I said, 
background facts. Our focus here is on the 
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1 spring-loading. So to the extent that the background 
2 facts can kind of elucidate the environment in which 
3 the spring-loading happened, sure, but I don't think 
4 we're going to need any -- I don't want to say we're 
5 not going to need any rulings on those facts, but 
6 certainly they're very minor, and the spring-loading 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
is really the meat of our case. 
THE COURT: It seems to me that the 
pumping is a different question. I mean, actually, 
your point is that the stock price on the date that 
these grants were made wasn't pumped. 
And if you show pumping, it actually 
decreases your damages claim because then there was --
so whatever the value of the stock was thought to be, 
15 then there's the actual v alue of the stock, given what 
16 was known by the directors about this Phase 2 result. 
17 You want the delta between those two things. And if 
18 the market price out there was higher because of 
19 pumping, actually, that would get the market price 
20 closer to what it should have been had there been full 
21 disclosure, in your view. 
22 So if you get into that stuff, if you 
23 start saying, "Oh, DreamTeam was pumping up the 
24 price," or whatever, you'd ironically be decreasing 
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your damages claim in terms what you could get in 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
front of me. So it doesn't seem to me like, in terms 
of the Delaware matter, you really want to touch that 
stuff. 
MR. TAYLOR: Like I said, it's 
certainly a minor part of our claims, and it's really 
7 the damages on the spring-loading options that we're 
8 going towards here in Delaware. 
9 So the factual overlap, I mean, it's 
10 like two ships passing in the night. It's really --
11 it's of no consequence to litigating our claims here 
12 
13 
in Delaware. And there's really no reason, no 
practical reason, to stay the Delaware litigation 
14 favor of the federal securities case. 
in 
15 And, I mean, as they pointed out, they 
16 believe that these claims should be litigated here in 
1 7 Delaware, and there is no reason for this Court to 
18 delay important issues of Delaware law for a 
19 securities case that hasn't even completed briefing 
20 yet. I believe the hearing is set for sometime in 
21 March on the motion to dismiss briefing, and the Court 
22 has taken under advisement other issues in the federal 
23 
24 
derivative cases. So --
THE COURT: What bad things could 
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1 happen if I waited? 
2 MR. TAYLOR: Well, I mean, there's 
3 always the risk -- well, I don't want to -- I don't 
4 want to lock us into a position, but there is ~ risk 
5 that the Court could make a decision on issues of 
13 
6 Delaware law where it's more -- I mean, it seems that 
7 this Court would be better placed to make those 
8 decisions. 
9 The motion to dismiss has been 
10 briefed, and the Court, like I said, has taken it 
11 under advisement. So to the extent that the Court 
12 does rule on the issues of demand futility, I mean, 
13 obviously, we think that -- and defendants also 
14 believe that those issues should -- are better decided 
15 in this Court. So I think to the extent that we 
16 could --
17 THE COURT: Let's say that I just 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
said, "You know What? California is likely to, if it 
goes forward, come out with some factual answers on 
some of this stuff, and I'm a utility-maximizing guy. 
I'll have more leisure, more opportunity, to deal with 
some of the other cases that Mr. Welch has brought in 
front of me and that we have together if I just kick 
back and let California deal with these things. And 
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1 then when California comes out with some findings of 
2 fact about what the directors knew or didn't know and 
3 what the market knew or didn't know, I can just plug 
4 those in and then put a Delaware framework on top of 
5 answers that I will have been given." 
6 
7 
8 
9 
wait? 
think, 
If that's what I could do, why not 
Why not chill out? 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, Your Honor, I 
like you said, I think the issues that are 
10 going to be dealt with, the factual issues that are 
11 going to be dealt with in the securities action, are 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
minor, play a minor role in our case. And I think 
that maybe we've answered some of the questions about 
knowledge with respect to -- with the 220 documents 
that, obviously, have been placed under seal and I 
can't discuss. So I think those issues are already in 
17 front of the Court now. 
18 And to the extent that California has 
19 to get to those issues, it doesn't make sense to wait 
20 for them because we already have those issues in front 
21 
22 
of the Court. 
23 questions? 
24 
I'm sorry. Do you have any other 
THE COURT: No. Not at the moment. 
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MR. TAYLOR: Great. Thank you, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Reply? 
MR. LANSTRA: Your Honor, if I may, 
just a couple points in rebuttal. 
Look, we can only go with what's in 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 the complaint. And it's not my job to figure out why 
9 they've decided they only want to go with 
10 spring-loading now that there's been a motion to stay, 
11 but there are DreamTeam allegations throughout the 
12 
13 
complaint. 
The very first paragraph of the 
14 complaint states, "Plaintiffs are bringing this 
15 consolidated stockholder derivative action on behalf 
16 of" the company's directors -- "on behalf of [the 
17 company] to remedy defendants' wrongful conduct 
18 of: (a) granting themselves spring-loaded stock 
19 
20 
options and (b) secretly engaging a stock 
promotion firm " 
21 They may argue that we're really 
22 pushing the stock options, but the DreamTeam is in 
23 there, and I suppose someone could read the other case 
24 that way. 
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9 
10 
11 
12 
16 
I want to really point out the 
primary -- just to make clear, if I didn't before, if 
there are Delaware questions of law, we believe Your 
Honor should answer them when the time comes. We do 
not believe that the breach of fiduciary claims as a 
matter of law are before the Court in California. We 
do not believe they will be. They are exactly like 
you said, Your Honor. They're questions of fact that 
overlap: Was there spring-loaded option grants made 
as a matter of fact? Were there misrepresentations? 
Those are at issue in both cases. 
THE COURT: Great. Why don't you 
13 segue into the motion to dismiss. 
14 
15 
MR. LANSTRA: Will do. 
Your Honor, in essence, the plaintiffs 
16 are alleging that the defendants learned of favorable 
17 clinical trial results on December 9th. On 
18 December 10th, the comp committee made option grants. 
19 Thereafter, the clinical trial results were released 
20 publicly and the stock price experienced a temporary 
21 increase as a result. The way we read the complaint, 
22 that is what is alleged. 
23 We believe under both Tyson and 
24 Desimone put together that that's not enough. There 
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17 
is a test that's set forth. Were the options issued 
according to a shareholder-approved comp plan? Yes. 
We believe that they've alleged that. 2(a), did the 
directors possess material nonpublic information soon 
to be released that would impact the company's share 
price? We believe they've alleged that. We've 
conceded that. 
It's Part 2(b) that is not alleged. 
9 Did the directors issue these options with the intent 
10 to circumvent otherwise valid shareholder-approved 
11 restrictions? There are no allegations outside of, 
12 frankly, the temporal relationship. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
The plaintiffs are asking for the 
intent to be inferred. They're relying on the 
inferences that were made in Tyson and Weiss. We 
don't think that that type of inference is there. 
17 There are little pieces in all the 
18 cases, including this one, but the facts supporting 
19 
20 
inference of intent in Tyson and Weiss had a lot to do 
with the repeated number. This doesn't mean you get a 
21 free pass, as they were arguing in the opposition, but 
22 it's the repeated number of times that they did this 
23 and the moving of the dates of the stock options. 
24 The allegations here, the only factual 
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1 allegations, actually suggest the opposite: that the 
2 decision to grant was made in October; that decisions 
3 of grants were annually made at the December meeting; 
4 no options were exercised; and there are no 
5 allegations that the announcement itself was moved. 
6 THE COURT: Why does the failure to 
7 exercise matter? 
8 
9 
MR. LANSTRA: Well, it runs to intent. 
I don't think it runs to the damages. I think that 
10 was what we saw in the opposition, was a response that 
11 doesn't mean that there aren't damages. But I think 
12 it does matter when you're saying what's the intent. 
13 
14 
The intent here is there is a deception. 
intent to take advantage of a situation. 
There is an 
None of 
15 these directors and none of the officers have taken 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
advantage of these allegedly low-ball options. 
well, I'll leave it at that. And I think --
THE COURT: What's the life of 
options? 
MR. LANSTRA: Ten years. 
THE COURT: So, I mean, it just 
And 
these 
-- it 
22 seems to me that if you get an option, I mean, having 
23 it allegedly underpriced is nice, but you don't 
24 necessarily have to go out and exercise it right away. 
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19 
MR. LANSTRA: No. That's fair. I 
think that's right. But, again, when you're being 
asked to take an inference from something that's just 
simply an allegation of the timing sequence and when 
we're trying to figure out is there an inference 
there -- you have other courts saying, "Well, they did 
it a bunch of times. They moved dates." 
I actually do think that the fact that 
9 they didn't run out right away and exercise the 
10 options and make immediate money does suggest 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
something. It certainly doesn't suggest the opposite. 
I mean, if they had ran out and did the exercises, 
then maybe we would have gotten some inference there. 
Then there's something to hold onto. 
THE COURT: Say they were just stupid. 
Like even guys who rob a bank know to lay low for a 
while and not to go out and spend a bunch of money 
that would call attention to themselves. I mean, it's 
19 sort of like shooting up a flare if you do that, isn't 
20 it? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
MR. LANSTRA: Fair enough. 
I will say, Your Honor, the same thing 
is being asked about on the timing. They did a 220 
request. They got the minutes. And the same day, 
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20 
December 9th, that the directors are talking about the 
clinical results, they're also talking about option 
grants. So if there is an inference to be made of 
intent to deceive, that doesn't really make a lot of 
sense either, the idea that they're going to talk 
about both of them right out in the open while, 
meanwhile, they have a deceptive scheme of fraud to do 
this. So I think there's many different ways. 
My basic point, though, is that all 
10 they've alleged is this temporal sequence, and that 
11 just doesn't seem enough. If that were the case, we 
12 might as well remove 2(b), because the fact of the 
13 
14 
15 
directors possessing the material nonpublic 
information would be enough and we wouldn't need an 
intent to circumvent. The plaintiffs' argument is 
16 that if you have (a), you necessarily have (b). 
17 THE COURT: Anything else? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
2 3 
Honor. 
brief, 
MR. LANSTRA: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Great. 
MR. LANSTRA: Thank you. 
MS. WINCHESTER: Good morning, Your 
As we pled -- as we stated in our opposition 
we pled everything that is necessary under 
24 Delaware law to satisfy the pleading burden at this 
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1 stage, which is that we raise a reasonable inference 
2 that the board of directors intentionally violated the 
3 stock option plan that was approved by the 
4 
5 
stockholders which did not allow spring-loading. 
did so with the possession of material inside 
They 
6 information. 
7 The Tyson case sets forth the factors 
8 that need to be pled, and we pled each of those, 
9 hands-down. One, the plaintiff has to establish that 
10 grants were given pursuant to an options plan. That 
11 was done. They were granted pursuant to the 2008 
12 option plan. Two, the plaintiff establishes that the 
13 directors who approved the plan or approved the 
14 
15 
grants, one, 
information. 
possessed the material inside 
We know that. We did a 220. They 
16 received the information at the December 9 board 
17 
18 
meeting. 
Not only did the board receive that 
19 information, but each of the option recipients 
20 received that information. There is no question that 
21 they knew that it was material inside information 
22 because the general counsel told them, "This is 
23 material inside information. You can't tell anybody 
24 about it." 
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1 Then they decided to grant the 
2 options. Not only did they decide to grant the 
3 options, the following day, when, by the way, the 
4 stock price was slightly lower than it was on the 9th, 
5 but they also did so with 80,000 more per director 
6 than they had agreed to several months prior. There 
7 was no preset date here. 
8 At the October board meeting, they 
9 said, "We' re going to grant options in December." 
10 Even if they had said they were going to grant options 
11 on December 10th, they still possessed material inside 
12 information at the time that they made the grants, 
13 and, importantly, and this goes to the second point, 
14 they issued the options with an intent to circumvent 
15 the stockholder-approved plans. 
16 As the Weiss Court said, the fact that 
17 they didn't disclose that they used this inside 
18 information when they made the grants is enough to 
19 raise a reasonable doubt and an inference that they 
20 purposely violated the 2008 plan. 
21 And here, unlike in Weiss and unlike 
22 in Tyson, not only did they violate the terms of the 
23 2008 plan, which did not allow spring-loading, which 
24 specifically said the option grants had to be made at 
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l fair market value, which was not fair market value 
2 when you know the stock price is going to pop the next 
3 day with the company's most important news in history, 
4 but here you have an affirmative disclosure that "We 
5 do not spring-load." 
6 So taken together, there's certainly 
7 at this stage of the pleadings enough to raise an 
8 inference that the board cannot consider a demand. 
9 Because not only do you have a majority of the 
10 six-member board, four of them, granted the options, 
11 but each of the six members received the options. 
12 There is no Delaware case law at all that exists that 
13 says that recipients of improper option awards get a 
14 free pass one time that they do it. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Your Honor, there's nothing more that 
I need to add unless you have any questions. 
THE COURT: I don't. Thank you. 
MS. WINCHESTER: You're welcome. 
THE COURT: Reply? 
MR. LANSTRA: Just briefly, Your 
21 Honor, I would just point out that there are no facts, 
22 
23 
again --
THE COURT: What would have happened 
24 if the CEO had traded on December 10th, bought shares? 
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MR. LANSTRA: If the CEO traded on 
December 10th and bought shares. Well, that would 
be -- we're talking about options being exercised. 
go back to my earlier point. I think maybe there's 
something there for an inference. 
THE COURT: If he bought those 
24 
I 
7 shares -- I mean, you're accepting that he -- I assume 
8 you'd be accepting that he was in possession of 
9 material nonpublic inside information at the time he 
10 would have acquired those shares. 
11 And it seems to me that the logic of 
12 your position would be that there would be no claim, 
13 no indication of scienter, and no possible claim, 
14 
15 
16 
unless and until he sold for profit. You know? 
MR. LANSTRA: Well, I would have to 
know what the strike price was. I think there would 
17 have to be other facts. 
18 THE COURT: No. He just goes out in 
19 the market and buys. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
options? 
facts. 
MR. LANSTRA: He's not taking the 
THE COURT: I'm slightly varying the 
So instead of getting beneficial ownership of 
24 shares through options, o ur CEO actually goes out and 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
0537 
1 buys in the market on the 10th, so at a time when he 
2 knows about the study but there isn't yet disclosure 
3 of the study. 
4 Again, it seems to me that the 
25 
5 implication of your argument is that he would have no 
6 potential insider trading liability because one could 
7 
8 
9 
not infer scienter. 
MR. LANSTRA: I don't think that's 
fair. I know where you're heading, but I think in our 
10 scenario, which I think is what we have to bounce this 
11 off of, you do have regular early times for things. 
12 Let's say we take your position but we 
13 also say that December 10th is his son's birthday, and 
14 on December 10th every year, he's made either a 
15 commitment or he's told his son --
16 THE COURT: Let's make it a little bit 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
more analogous. Let's say in December, he buys, 
because that's what they agreed to do in October. 
They said, "Let's price in December. We've 
historically done this stuff at year-end." So let's 
say that he has a historical pattern and practice of 
buying shares in December. Sometimes he does it on 
the 5th. Sometimes he does it on the 15th. Sometimes 
he's a little bit slow. He does it after Christmas, 
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before New Year's. He's a December guy. So let's 
assume that that's the case. 
MR. LANSTRA: Right. But he gets to 
act unilaterally. I think we have to separate the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 facts. He's acting unilaterally. He's not acting as 
6 a committee that needs to convene, that has set a 
7 
8 
schedule. And I think that that does matter here. 
Yes. Look, I think you're probably 
9 closer if you had a committee that didn't have a 
10 meeting scheduled; that hadn't done this at their 
11 meetings for three straight years; that hadn't 
12 indicated in October that they were going to issue 
13 grants; and then just a one-member compensation 
14 committee acts on December 10th. But, ·again, you're 
15 being asked to take an inference from allegations that 
16 just aren't applied. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Great. I 
18 interrupted you with my question, so I don't know if 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
there were other points you wanted to make. 
MR. LANSTRA: Actually, I believe the 
point I make got embodied in my answer. 
your time, Your Honor. 
Thank you for 
THE COURT: You're a good advocate. 
MS. WINCHESTER: If I can address one 
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1 thing. 
2 THE COURT: Sure. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
MS. WINCHESTER: They found out on the 
9th the material information. They could have 
disclosed the information on that date and granted the 
following day, which was when they granted, and then 
we wouldn't be here today. 
THE COURT: I assume you'd say they 
could have done other things. 
rescheduled the meeting. 
MS. WINCHESTER: 
9th and they met on the 10th. 
information on the 9th. 
They could have 
Well, they met on the 
They found out the 
THE COURT: Right. But on the 10th, 
15 they could have said, "You know what? Now is not the 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
right time to do this." 
MS. WINCHESTER: "We have inside 
information we're not allowed to use to our 
advantage." 
THE COURT: "We ought to come back 
21 right after Christmas and do this," or something like 
22 that. 
23 MS. WINCHESTER: Or when we file our 
24 proxy with the disclosure of the grants and say that 
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8 
we don't spring-load, they could have said, "Hey, 
the way, we spring-loaded a couple of months ago," 
which they didn't do. 
THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. 
going to go ahead and give you my answer now. 
28 
by 
I'm 
There's two things for us to address 
today, collectively: the motion to stay and the motion 
to dismiss. So for the reasons I'm going to give you, 
9 I'm going to grant in part the motion to stay and I'm 
10 going to deny in its entirety the motion to dismiss as 
11 to the aspects of the claims that I am not staying. 
12 The factual background is as follows: 
13 The plaintiffs are stockholders of CytRx Corporation. 
14 The nominal defendant, CytRx, is a Delaware 
15 corporation with its principal place of business in 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Los Angeles. It's a biopharmaceutical research and 
development company specializing in oncology, so 
cancer-related things. 
and officers of CytRx. 
The defendants are directors 
The key facts are as follows: In 
21 December 2011, the company commenced a -- I should 
22 
23 
24 
say, these are allegations. They're not facts, but I 
have to assume they're true for purposes of today, so 
that's why I call them facts. 
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In December 2011, the company 
commenced a Phase 2b clinical trial to evaluate the 
preliminary efficacy and safety of its primary drug, 
aldoxorubicin. During the March and September 2013 
time frame, there was indications from analysts and 
29 
6 investors that the effect of the results, the 
7 implications of the results of the Phase 2b trial, 
8 would be critical. 
9 On December 9, 2013, all of the 
10 individual defendants attended a board meeting during 
11 which they were informed that the Phase 2b clinical 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
results were positive. They were informed that the 
results of the trial would be "transformational." 
They were also reminded that this information was 
nonpublic and confidential. 
The very next day, December 10, 2013, 
the compensation committee granted options to purchase 
2,925,000 shares of the company's common stock at a 
strike price of $2.39 per share. That at the time was 
the trading price of the company's stock. At the 
time, the company had not released any information 
about the very positive and transformational clinical 
results of the Phase 2b trials. After the market 
24 closed, the company indicated that it would announce 
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the results the next day. 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
On the next day, the company issued a 
press release before the market opened touting the 
positive results of the trials. The market reacted 
favorably, with the company's stock price gapping up 
to $3.90 per share on the open and closing at $4.02 
per share. The company stock price reached a two-year 
high of $6.12 per share the next day. 
So just to review, December 9th, you 
10 find out about these great transformational results. 
11 December 10th, before the results are disclosed and at 
12 a time when you know these results are confidential 
13 and that the information is not public, you grant 
14 yourself and your senior officers approximately 
15 3 million options at a strike price reflecting the 
16 price of the stock without any market knowledge of 
17 this information. And then the next day, you release 
18 the information, and then, indeed, the stock price 
19 spikes. 
20 There has been this lawsuit here as 
21 well as lawsuits elsewhere filed regarding this 
22 behavior, as well as some others regarding the 
23 company's disclosures. 
24 For example, on January 30, 2014, the 
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1 company announced a stock offering and filed ~ 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
prospectus with the SEC . The stock price increased to 
$7.98 per share after that announcement. 
In March 2014, it was disclosed that 
the company had hired a firm called the DreamTeamGroup 
to promote the company's stock. There are reports 
that alleged that insiders were involved in drafting 
or editing the DreamTeam articles and that those 
articles were designed to pump up the company's stock 
price. 
There are currently three federal 
securities class actions pending in Federal Court in 
California addressing the DreamTeam allegations and 
the alleged pumping up of the stock price. There are 
15 also some derivative actions in California. 
16 The complaint here focuses principally 
17 on the grant by the insiders of the stock options to 
18 themselves. 
19 allegations. 
20 
It does mention secondarily the DreamTeam 
The first motion, the motion to stay, 
21 seeks to stay this action in deference to the 
22 California federal securities actions. 
23 It is certainly true that this Court 
24 often stays derivative actions that have been filed as 
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follow-on indemnification-oriented proceedings that 
seek to recover the damages suffered by a company as a 
result of bad disclosures. In that type of scenario, 
4 it makes eminent sense for the disclosure claims to go 
5 first. 
6 Part of what you have to figure out in 
7 the indemnification action is, A, whether the company 
8 suffered any harm and, B, the amount that it suffered 
9 before you can figure out whether there's anything to 
10 indemnify. So in that type of context, it makes 
11 eminent sense for the Delaware derivative action to be 
12 stayed. 
13 
14 
In this case, however, that is not 
what the principal claims are doing. The principal 
15 claims in this case allege a self-interested 
16 compensation decision by the fiduciaries of a Delaware 
17 corporation. This is alleged to be a substantive 
18 Delaware law wrong. 
19 
20 disclosure. 
The primary issue here is not one of 
One can reframe it as disclosure, and 
21 enterprising plaintiffs' lawyers are very good at 
22 reframing substantive wrongs as disclosure claims so 
23 as to get them into Federal Court. So if you have the 
24 substantive wrong and you don't accurately disclose 
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1 that you have engaged in the substantive wrong, a 
2 plaintiff can allege that you have a disclosure claim 
3 because you failed to disclose that you were doing 
4 these bad things. 
5 The meat of the claim, though, is the 
6 underlying substantive wrong, and the disclosure claim 
7 only rises or falls based on what is a matter of 
8 Delaware law and substantive corporate law. That's 
9 the exact opposite of a case like a tagalong 
10 indemnification claim, where the substantive wrong is 
11 one of disclosure and the Delaware law issue only 
12 arises depending on the outcome of the federal 
13 disclosure claim. 
14 Here, in my view, as to the 
15 overcompensation claims, the self-interested 
16 compensation claims, the core wrong is a Delaware one. 
17 In my view, there is no reason to defer and it would 
18 be bad policy to defer to a federal securities action 
19 that is primarily concerned with disclosures over a 
20 broader period of time and concerned with potentially 
21 moving money from one group of stockholders to 
22 another. What the Delaware case is about is the 
23 behavior of fiduciaries, which is a quintessentially 
24 Delaware concern. 
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1 If I reframe this analysis in the 
2 technical language of the McWane doctrine, which is 
3 the framework in which it has been briefed, the McWane 
4 
5 
6 
doctrine seeks to address when a second-filed action 
should defer to a first-filed action. What you don't 
want is duplicative lawsuits. What you want is to 
7 minimize overall litigation costs. 
8 Here, the federal securities law 
9 action, although it touches on some similar factual 
10 issue, it is not sufficiently overlapping with the 
11 Delaware action to, in my view, be treated as 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
first-filed under McWane. And that's for the reasons 
that I've already addressed. 
Another important factor in 
determining whether a stay is appropriate is the first 
Court's ability to render justice. The federal 
securities action is involved in rendering justice on 
different theories to different stockholders regarding 
different claims. It does not address the . core issue 
20 of this case, which is self-dealing by Delaware 
21 fiduciaries. 
22 I could also analyze this under the 
23 guise of forum non conveniens, which asks which Court 
24 is best suited to address the matter and whether there 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
would be overwhelming prejudice to the defendants from 
litigating here. Certainly, I don't think there is 
overwhelming prejudice to fiduciaries of a Delaware 
corporation to litigate breach of fiduciary duty 
claims in Delaware. 
Now, where I do think the defendants 
7 have a point is as to the allegations of the complaint 
8 relating to the secondary stock offering or the 
9 DreamTeam. Those, I think, are primarily federal 
10 issues about the disclosures that were made to 
11 stockholders and whether those disclosures pumped up 
12 or otherwise manipulated the stock price. That's 
13 primarily a federal concern, not a Delaware concern. 
14 Disclosure is historically principally a federal 
15 concern, at least in terms of companies on the public 
16 markets. 
17 It is not clear, or not entirely 
18 clear, from the complaint to what degree the 
19 
20 
21 
22 
plaintiffs intend to litigate those matters. There 
are some allegations in the complaint that suggest 
they do intend to litigate some of those things here. 
To avoid any confusion, I am going to 
23 grant the motion to stay to the extent the plaintiffs 
24 seek to litigate anything about the DreamTeam or the 
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secondary offering. I think those allegations overlap 
with, to a greater degree, and should be litigated in 
the federal securities action. 
By contrast, I am going to deny the 
stay to the extent the complaint attacks the allegedly 
self-interested decision that was made on December 
10th and the sequence of events that occurred on the 
9th, 10th, and 11th that resulted in the receipt by 
the insiders of stock options with a strike price of 
10 $2.39 per share at a time when, according to the 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
allegations of the complaint, those insiders were 
possessing material nonpublic information about a 
Phase 2 trial that would be transformational for the 
company and the single biggest event in the company's 
history. 
My discussion of the facts has likely 
foreshadowed the reasoning that goes into my denial of 
the motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1. Rule 23.1 is 
designed to ensure that the appropriate corporate 
decision-makers have the ability to decide whether to 
bring a corporate claim. A stockholder should not be 
able to divest the appropriate corporate 
decision-maker of its ability to decide what to do 
with a claim simply by bringing suit. Where, however, 
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1 the appropriate corporate decision-makers are disabled 
2 because of self-interest, demand is excused. 
3 Here, there was a six-member board. 
4 Four of the members were part of the compensation 
5 committee that granted the options, including to 
6 themselves. All of the directors received options. 
7 This is quintessentially self-interested conduct to 
8 which entire fairness applies. 
9 To the extent that there is a need for 
10 scienter, I do think that in this case, there is an 
11 inference of scienter. It may well be that in a case 
12 where you're talking about, generally, whether 
13 directors had knowledge about inside information, such 
14 as quarterly results, a periodic granting of options 
15 on a regular date, according to a preset time, is a 
16 countervailing factor that mitigates the inference of 
17 
18 
scienter. 
Here, we're talking about a situation 
19 where people got news about the company that was going 
20 to be transformational, knew it was nonpublic, knew it 
21 was material. The very next day, before there was any 
22 disclosure, they granted themselves and senior 
23 officers 3 million options. They granted themselves 
24 not the 100,000 options each that originally were 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
0550 
38 
1 contemplated in October but actually bumped the number 
2 up to 180,000 options each. There would have been 
3 myriad ways for them to not act so as to receive this 
4 rather substantial benefit in terms of the strike 
5 price below where the market price was likely to 
6 settle and what the intrinsic value of the share 
7 likely was. one ea s y method of doing s·o would have 
8 been to simply postpone the meeting until after the 
9 news was released. By that I mean postpone the 
10 December 10th meeting at which the options were 
11 
12 
granted. 
When you have this type of 
13 eyebrow-raising self-interested conduct, the fact that 
14 
15 
16 
you haven't done it a lot doesn't defeat an inference 
of scienter. The fact that you may have planned 
historically to grant options in December doesn't 
17 defeat an inference of scienter. 
18 Nobody said you had to do it on 
19 December 10th when you knew this stuff and the market 
20 
21 
22 
23 
didn't. How about December 20th? At that point, the 
market would have known it. If you really had to do 
it on December 10th, you might have tried to make a 
determination about what the fair market value was on 
24 that date, assuming full knowledge by a willing buyer 
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1 and seller of all material information and a buyer and 
2 seller not under any compulsion to buy or compulsion 
3 to sell. 
4 So both for purposes of the first and, 
5 indeed, the second prong of Aronson, I think demand is 
6 futile. 
7 Likewise, for purposes of Rule 
8 12 (b) (6), having withstood the higher standard of Rule 
9 23 .1, the complaint states a claim. 
10 Just so I'm not accused of glomming 
11 everything together, I will go through, briefly, each 
12 of the counts. 
13 Count I is framed precisely as a 
14 
15 
granting-of-spring-loaded options claim. In my view, 
this case is controlled by Weiss and Tyson. A case 
16 like Desimone, which involves much less egregious 
17 allegations, is clearly distinguishable. 
18 It really would be difficult to design 
19 a fact pattern that would more graphically capture 
20 what spring-loading is all about. It's almost like a 
21 law school hypothetical in terms of what you would 
22 want to have factually to really put the policy 
23 question directly at issue as to whether this is the 
24 type of permissible behavior in which fiduciaries can 
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engage. 
So Count I states a claim. 
Count II alleges waste. Waste is 
normally really hard to allege. I mean it's easy to 
allege. It's hard to survive a motion to dismiss 
because you have to allege a transaction that no 
reasonable person would approve. In other words, 
40 
8 economic terms so one-sided as to create an inference 
9 that people weren't acting in good faith. 
10 Here, you actually have it, because, 
11 basically, what the allegation is, is that the 
12 
13 
14 
directors found a way to give themselves dollars for 
25 cents. In other words, the stock at the time, 
because of the transformational news that they knew 
15 and the market didn't, had a fair market value far 
16 
17 
greater than the $2.39 strike price. Indeed, it 
ultimately went up to 7-ish bucks a share. But 
18 because they used the market price where the market 
19 did not know about this information, they were able to 
20 price the options for approximately 25 percent or a 
21 third of that. So they got dollars for 25 cents or 33 
22 cents. 
23 
24 for 25 cents? 
Would an ordinary person swap dollars 
No. An ordinary person, if you go up 
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1 to them and say, "I've got $5. How about you give me 
2 $1," they're not going to do that deal. 
3 For fiduciaries to say, "Yes, we will 
4 
5 
6 
do that deal" raises an inference of waste. That 
the type of transaction that no reasonable person 
would agree to. That doesn't mean you can't 
is 
7 eventually prove it's not a waste, but for pleading 
8 purposes, giving yourself dollars for 25 cents or 33 
9 cents or whatever the exact number works out to be, 
10 
11 
12 
13 
that's waste. 
Count III alleges more generally a 
breach of the duty of loyalty. That's really what 
we're talking about here. When you engage in behavior 
14 that, based on the allegation of the complaint, 
15 appears self-interested such that you give yourself 
16 assets for less than their fair value, that's classic 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
breach of the duty of loyalty stuff. 
certainly states a claim. 
So Count III 
And Count IV reframes these theories 
as unjust enrichment. That is a fallback claim, 
assuming that none of the other theories apply. But 
22 the idea of unjust enrichment is the unjust retention 
23 of a benefit that you really shouldn't have gotten. 
24 When you get dollars for whatever it works out to be, 
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2 when you hadn't told the market about this 
3 transformational information, you're unjustly 
enriching yourself. So Count IV states a claim. 
42 
4 
5 
6 
I doubt it's 
would justify relief in this 
the claim that ultimately 
case. Indeed, if I had 
7 to bet, assuming the allegations prove out as they've 
8 been alleged, I would expect to rest on Count I or 
9 Count III without having to reach Count II and Count 
IV. But it's there. It states a claim. 10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Lastly, in terms of Section 102 (b) (7), 
this is self-interested conduct to which exculpation 
under Section 102(b) (7) doesn't apply. 
So those are my rulings. Whatever you 
all want to do about implementing this is fine with 
me. I can't remember whether I have things in my 
queue on this or not. But I do think it would 
probably be good to have something shorter and more 
19 the point than this transcript making clear that I 
20 have stayed as to the secondary offering and the 
21 DreamTeam. 
22 What's going to go forward here and 
to 
23 what I would like you all to work out a schedule on so 
24 that this will get promptly to trial is the events of 
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1 December 9th, 10th and 11th and the stock option 
2 grants. 
3 And I say get promptly to trial 
4 because this is a complaint that was based on some 
5 books and records obtained pursuant to Section 220. 
6 When you've got this sequence -- and again, if it 
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7 turns out that the plaintiffs have made this stuff up 
8 and the board actually didn't have the study on 
9 December 10th, that's a different story. Then there's 
10 all kinds of bigger problems. But if the sequence is 
11 as pled here, I don't think you have a viable summary 
12 
13 
14 
15 
judgment motion. I think you have facts and evidence 
from which one could infer bad behavior. 
Now, somebody may prove at trial, no, 
those inferences shouldn't be drawn. Everything was 
16 on the up and up. But those aren't determinations 
17 that could be made on a summary judgment record. 
18 Perhaps you all can convince me 
19 otherwise. But what I think, as a case management 
20 matter, you all ought to do is figure out a way to get 
21 this to trial this year, ideally, maybe third quarter. 
22 We could all get back together around the time that 
23 school is starting. And we can find out what the real 
24 deal was and what ended up happening. 
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All right. So Mr. Lanstra, you're the 
movant. Do you have any questions about my rulings? 
Is there anything I can elaborate on? Is there 
anything I haven't sufficiently covered? 
MR. LANSTRA: No, Your Honor. Thank 
6 you. 
7 
8 
THE COURT: Great. 
Ms. Winchester and Mr. Taylor, how 
9 about you? 
10 I guess, Ms. Winchester, since I 
11 basically agreed with you, you probably don't have any 
12 
13 
concerns. 
Mr. Taylor, is there anything in the 
14 first instance that you are unclear about, about what 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
I have stayed and haven't stayed? 
clear. 
MR. TAYLOR: No, 
Thank you. 
Your Honor . Very 
THE COURT: Ms. Winchester, how about 
you? 
MS. WINCHESTER: I have no questions, 
21 Your Honor. 
22 
23 
24 
THE COURT: Great. Thank you, 
everyone, for coming in. I'll look forward to seeing 
you all in due course and getting a schedule. I 
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24 
appreciate everyone's time and stay warm. 
(Court adjourned at 11:55 a.m.) 
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